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RESTRUCTURING THE DEBATE ON
UNAUTHORIZED HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION*
SAIRA MOHAMED**

Scholars and practitionersaddressingthe problem of unauthorized
humanitarianintervention often characterizethe central difficulty of
the issue as arising out of the fact that when the U.N. Security
Council fails to authorize states to use military force to stop mass
atrocities, the law requires a result-doing nothing-that is
illegitimate and morally abhorrent. One scholarly solution to this
predicament has been to subordinate considerations of legality to
those of legitimacy or morality by arguing that in certain cases in
which the Security Council does not authorize an intervention that
should take place, the internationalcommunity should tolerate the
unlawful intervention as "excused" or "justified."
This Article responds to this recent willingness to look beyond the
law by illuminating the unaccounted costs of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention and by proposing a more rigorous
framework for assessing these uses of force. Specifically, this Article
advocates a new emphasis on the systemic consequences of
unauthorized intervention, focusing on the impact of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention on two elements of the international
system that preserve the primacy of law over power: first, the
principle of sovereign equality of states, and second, the principle
that military force should be used only in the common interest. This
Article urges that the impact of unauthorized uses of nondefensive
force on these principles, and therefore on the vitality of law in the
internationalsystem, should be an essential consideration in any
evaluation of unauthorized humanitarian intervention. By
considering the deeper implications of looking the other way when
states resort to war to protect human rights, this Article challenges
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the conventional account of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention as raising a choice between protecting human rights
and protecting sovereignty, and it contends that the roots and
benefits of the prohibition against unauthorized military force
should compel policy makers to consider alternatives to military
force when responding to grave human rights abuses.
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INTRODUCTION

The regulation of violence constitutes a complex and significant

undertaking in any society. Rules that determine legitimate uses of
violence not only structure behavior in a particular way, but also
reflect and construct attitudes about the role that violence should play
in the shared life of the community. In international society, laws on
the use of force serve both to limit the incidence of war and to define

its proper function; these laws, enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations and in customary international law, are crucial to the
preservation of the international community.
Despite this vital role, recent years have seen a turn away from
the law in debates over one of the most hotly contested questions
concerning violence in the international sphere: humanitarian
intervention, or the use of armed force by a state or states, without
authorization by the U.N. Security Council, for the purpose of
protecting nationals of the target state from large-scale human rights
abuses. In the run-up to the 2008 U.S. presidential election, for
example, the question of what to do about Darfur provoked
impassioned pronouncements that inertia on the part of the

international community should not stop the United States from
undertaking a vigorous campaign of military action-along with
diplomacy, of course-to prevent attacks against peacekeepers, break
down barriers to humanitarian aid, and stop the killing, rape, and
displacement of civilians that have devastated the area for years.' The
1. See, e.g., John McCain & Bob Dole, Rescue Darfur Now, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2006, at B7; Barack Obama & Sam Brownback, Policy Adrift on Darfur, WASH. POST,
Dec. 27, 2005, at A25; Tom Curry, Exit Iraq, Enter Darfur?, MSNBC.CoM, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17034034/
(quoting statements of Hillary Clinton
supporting U.S. military action in Darfur); see also Paul Richter & Noam N. Leavy, On
Foreign Policy, He's Willing to Go His Own Way, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at 1 (noting
support of vice-presidential nominee Joe Biden for NATO ground troops in Sudan to end
violence in Darfur); David E. Sanger, Rivals Split on U.S. Power, but Ideas Defy Easy
Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Al (noting that Obama had expressed support for
setting up a no-fly zone but when pressed, was hesitant to commit to U.S. ground troops in
Sudan); Charlie Savage, Susan E. Rice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A22 (quoting a 2007
statement of an Obama foreign-policy adviser before the Senate Foreign Relations
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candidates, so divided on their approaches to other foreign policy
issues, were uniquely united on this matter,2 not only in their
consistent belief that the suffering in Sudan had to end, but also in
their apparent lack of concern for what international law would say

about the United States taking on Darfur without the United Nations.
The turn away from the law is not surprising. To many
commentators, the central problem of humanitarian intervention is
that when the Security Council fails to authorize states to use military
force to stop mass atrocities, the law requires a result-to do nothing
at all'-that is illegitimate and morally abhorrent. One solution to this
predicament has been to subordinate considerations of legality to

those of legitimacy or morality. Some scholars have turned to the
criminal law categories of excuse and justification as a basis for
arguing that in certain cases in which the Security Council will not
authorize an intervention that should take place, states should
tolerate the unlawful intervention as "excused" or "justified."4 This
proposal-which I refer to as the "criminal law approach"-has been

welcomed in the scholarly literature about humanitarian intervention,
and its sense that the rules of international law must be tempered by
considerations of morality has been advocated in practice as well.

Most prominently, the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (also known as the Goldstone Commission) declared
NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo "illegal but legitimate." 5

Committee supporting U.S. military action against Sudan to end genocide in Darfur and
arguing that U.S. intervention without U.N. authorization would not be illegal).
2. See Joint Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, John McCain & Barack Obama,
We Stand United on Sudan, (May 28, 2008), http://www.savedarfur.org/page/content/
CandidatesStatement/ ("We stand united and demand that the genocide and violence in
Darfur be brought to an end.").
3. See infra note 107 (discussing the view that humanitarian intervention raises a
choice between military action and doing nothing at all).
4. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 139 (2002) [hereinafter FRANCK, RECOURSE TO

FORCE] (articulating theory of intervention); Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and
Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 212-16, 227-31 (J.L. Holzgrefe &
Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter Franck, Interpretation and Change]
(articulating theory of intervention). The scholars who advocate these types of approaches
vary in their use of these terms, and they show little loyalty to the nuances of the criminal
law doctrines. See infra Part II.A.2.
5. INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE KOSOvO REPORT 4 (2000) [hereinafter
KOSOVO REPORT]. Just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Anne-Marie Slaughter
proposed that the Bush administration's decision to use force without Security Council
authorization could also be described as" 'illegal but legitimate.'" Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Op-Ed., Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,2003, at A33.
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Using the criminal law approach as a starting point from which to
orient its analysis, this Article proposes a more rigorous framework
for evaluating unauthorized humanitarian intervention and calls for
placing greater focus on the systemic impact of unlawful uses of force
to protect human rights. Most accounts of the problem of
unauthorized intervention focus narrowly on the particular
circumstances of the humanitarian crisis at hand, such as the scale of
the human suffering, the prospects for military success, or the motives
of the intervener. These accounts fit well with the predominant
characterization of the problem as raising a choice between
protecting human rights or protecting state sovereignty.6 With the
question posed in this way, the relevant considerations in determining
the propriety of unauthorized intervention are limited to confirming
that the violence to be addressed is of a sufficient magnitude to justify
an intrusion on state sovereignty, that military force appears a
promising way to end the violence, and that the intervener is not
using a pretext of humanitarianism to get around otherwise intact
barriers against armed intervention in the affairs of another sovereign
state.
This traditional approach, however, fails to consider the
significant impact of unauthorized humanitarian intervention on the
international system's regulation of state power. This Article argues
that the question of unauthorized intervention implicates two crucial
principles of the international system that serve to define
international society as one in which law, not power, is the proper
basis for state behavior and interaction. Specifically, unauthorized
humanitarian intervention jeopardizes (1) the rule of sovereign
equality, which demands that all states are equally obliged to follow
the law and (2) the concentration of control over nondefensive
military force in the United Nations. The observance of these
principles is necessary for a system that is governed by law, rather
than power, and observance of these principles is necessarily
endangered by accommodation and acceptance of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, any debate concerning
unauthorized humanitarian intervention should account for the
implications of intervention for sovereign equality and international
control of military force.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the legal
status of unauthorized humanitarian intervention. Discussing
arguments that the U.N. Charter allows states to use armed force
6. See infra Part I.C.
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without Security Council authorization, as well as claims that recent
state practice has created a customary international law right of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention, this Part concludes that
despite changes in traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and the
accompanying development of a rigorous human rights regime,
humanitarian intervention undertaken without Security Council
authorization remains a violation of international law. It then
considers the criminal law approach to unauthorized humanitarian
intervention, under which scholars have advocated importing the
criminal law defenses of excuse and justification into the international
sphere in order to situate within the law cases in which the law
prohibits what morality or legitimacy demands.
Part II argues that the criminal law approach is an unsuitable
framework for evaluating unauthorized humanitarian intervention.
Beginning with an analysis of how the approach seeks to use the
criminal law to characterize state behavior in the context of
humanitarian intervention, it then turns to a critique of the criminal
law approach. First, this Article contends that the approach fails to
offer a convincing explanatory model for past interventions. Second,
it posits that even if state behavior and institutional action were to
adapt to better fit the model, the criminal law approach still is a
troubling framework for evaluating unauthorized humanitarian
intervention because of its limited focus on the immediate causes and
consequences of intervention. This Part highlights two features of the
international system that complicate the transposition of the criminal
law categories of excuse and justification to international law: the
frequent absence of explicit determinations of illegality and the
impact of noncompliance with a law on transformation of that law.
Part III argues that any evaluation of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention must consider the systemic consequences of such an
action. In particular, greater attention should be paid to the impact of
an unauthorized use of force on the Charter's fundamental principles
that (1) all states are equal before the law and (2) control over
nondefensive military force should reside in the international
community (by way of the Security Council), not in individual states.
Both serve to limit the exercise of power in the international system,
and both are preconditions to the survival of international law as a
governing mechanism of international society. Thus, evaluating
unauthorized intervention without considering these two principles
poses a danger to the integrity of international law overall. This Part
concludes by defending the assumptions made in this Article about
the functions of international law in the international system.
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This Article contributes to the literature on humanitarian
intervention by investigating the consequences of the criminal law
approach, the contours of which are increasingly advanced but
scarcely elaborated. Further, it challenges the predominant account of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention, which characterizes the
issue as a battle between human rights and state sovereignty, and
reconceptualizes the problem of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention by considering the effects of tolerating unauthorized
intervention on the capacity of international law to shape state
behavior.
I. DEBATING THE LAW OF UNAUTHORIZED HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION

This Part examines the law of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention under the U.N. Charter.7 Reviewing the status of
unauthorized intervention, both from a positivist approach to
international law and from the perspective of a policy-oriented
approach, this Part concludes that international law prohibits
unauthorized humanitarian intervention. This Part then turns to the
work of some international legal scholars to explain how theorists
have approached the question of how the law should respond to
situations in which an unauthorized intervention should take place,
despite its illegality. This discussion connects the popularity of this
approach to its alignment with the predominant account of
unauthorized intervention as raising a conflict between state
sovereignty and human rights.

7. Consistent with prevailing interpretations of international law, this Article
excludes from its definition of humanitarian intervention actions undertaken with the
consent of the target government, as well as those undertaken to protect the nationals of
the intervening state. Moreover, this Article takes the position that an intervention is
authorized only if the Security Council has explicitly approved a use of force; a
determination that a situation is a threat to international peace and security does not
constitute an authorization for the use of force. Contra Adam Roberts, NA TO's
"Humanitarian War" over Kosovo, SURVIVAL, Autumn 1999, at 102, 105-08 (claiming
that Security Council resolutions calling on Yugoslavia to cease attacks on civilians and
contemplating further action "provided some legal basis for military action" by NATO).
For a discussion of six incidents in which states have argued that their military
interventions were justified by implicit Security Council authorization, see Jules Lobel &
Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force,
Cease Firesand the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 131-33 (1999).
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The Law of UnauthorizedHumanitarianIntervention

The first steps toward the establishment of the United Nations
took place amid the unleashing of aggressive war and the commission

of human rights violations of unprecedented horror and scale.8
Accordingly, although the promotion of human rights constituted a
significant focus of the United Nations, the aim of the creators of the
new organization was, above all, the suppression of armed conflict.9 A

right of humanitarian intervention, therefore, did not figure into the
U.N. Charter.
The drafters agreed from the outset to recognize that the
intention of the participating governments in forming the
organization was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war."' Accordingly, the first purpose outlined in the Charter is "[t]o
maintain international peace and security."" To achieve this purpose,
the U.N. system is built around a central rule, set forth in Article 2(4)
of the Charter, that prohibits the use of force in international
relations: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner

8. See generally STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF

THE UNITED NATIONS (2003) (describing the formation of the United Nations).
9. In the 1943 Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, the United States,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China announced their intention to establish an
international organization "for the maintenance of international peace and security."
Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Nov. 1, 1943, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 755, 756 (1943) [hereinafter Declaration

of Four Nations]. The powers met at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 to draft proposals for the
establishment of the organization; these proposals, which came to form the basis for the
U.N. Charter, did not include the protection of human rights among the purposes of the
new organization. See Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization, Oct. 7, 1944, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:

DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 890, 890 (1944) (including among purposes the achievement of
"international cooperation" in the solution of "humanitarian problems," but not expressly
including human rights promotion or protection).
10. U.N. Charter pmbl.; see also Ruidiger Wolfrum, Preamble, in THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 33, 34-35 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002) (explaining
that the reference to the "scourge of war" was meant to indicate both that the United
Nations was formed in response to the two world wars and that the Organization's
member states intended to prevent the recurrence of armed conflicts in the future).
11. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. Whether the purposes of the United Nations
contained in Article 1 are binding is a matter of some controversy. See Ridiger Wolfrum,
Article I, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 10, at
39, 40 (noting that the placement of the purposes in the Charter suggests that they are
legally binding but that the wording of Article 1 suggests that the provision sets out
political objectives rather than legal obligations).
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inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.' 1 2 As a

peremptory norm of international law, this prohibition is binding not
only on U.N. members but also on all states. 13 Like the League of

Nations Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of the interwar
period, 4 the U.N. Charter established a system in which peace is the
default state in international relations and war is an exceptional
occurrence that requires justification. The drafters sought to institute
a system far more rigorous than that of the League era, however, and
the Charter accordingly provides for only two exceptions to the
prohibition on armed force. First, in the event of an "armed attack,"
Article 51 provides states a right of self-defense without Council

authorization for the use of force. 15 Second, the Security Council, as
part of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, may authorize the use of force by member states. 16
12. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. The drafters chose to use the term "use of force"
rather than "war" as a result of the failings of the League of Nations era. The Covenant of
the League of Nations regulated only the resort to "war" and did not address uses of force
not amounting to war; the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact similarly condemned "recourse to
war" but made no mention of uses of force short of war. See League of Nations Covenant
arts. 12, 13, 15; General Treaty for the Renunciation of War art. I, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; see also ANTHONY CLARK AREND
& ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 21-24 (1993)
(discussing failures of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact).
13. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 99-102 (4th ed.
2005) (discussing judicial and other opinions on status of use of force prohibition as a
peremptory norm and consequences thereof).
14. See League of Nations Covenant pmbl. (announcing acceptance of members "of
obligations not to resort to war"); Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 12, art. I (renouncing
war as an instrument of international relations).
15. Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51.
16. See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 53. During the Cold War period, there were only two
instances in which the Security Council is believed to have authorized the use of force: in
1950, after the invasion by North Korea of South Korea-though the Council at that time
only "[r]ecommend[ed]" that U.N. Members assist South Korea in repelling the attack,
S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950)-and in 1966, to prevent, "by use of
force if necessary," the arrival in Mozambique of tankers believed to be carrying oil for
Southern Rhodesia, S.C. Res. 221, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (Apr. 9, 1966). For further
discussion of the details of these authorizations, see MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW:
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 16-18 (2005). Since the

end of the Cold War, the Council has used its powers to authorize force more frequently,
including authorizing member states to "use all necessary means" to restore international
peace and security in Kuwait after Iraq's 1990 invasion, see S.C. Res. 678, 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (Nov. 23, 1990); to "take the necessary measures" to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia in 1992, see S.C. Res. 770, 6, U.N. Doc. SIRES/770
(Aug. 13, 1990); to "take all measures necessary" to establish a secure environment for
humanitarian assistance in Somalia in 1992, see S.C. Res. 794, 3, U.N. Doc. S[RES/794
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To many international lawyers, the bright-line rule prohibiting
the use of force by individual states, except in cases of self-defense or
Council authorization, indicates indisputably the unlawfulness of
unauthorized humanitarian interventions.17 Although the Charter

includes in the purposes of the United Nations the "achieve[ment of]
international co-operation in ...promoting and encouraging respect

for human rights,"' 8 the absence of any provision affirmatively
permitting the use of force to protect human rights, coupled with the
(Dec. 3, 1992); and to "form a multinational force under unified command" to restore the
Aristide government in Haiti in 1994, see S.C. Res. 940, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31,
1994). See also MICHAEL J. MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND: THE GROWTH OF UN
DECISION MAKING ON CONFLICT AND POSTCONFLICT ISSUES AFTER THE COLD WAR

145-58 (2006) (discussing each authorization). In 2008 the Council authorized states to use
"all necessary means" to combat piracy in Somalia's territorial waters and land territory.
See S.C. Res. 1851, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 18, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
17. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY

STATES 342 (1963) ("[I]t is extremely doubtful if [humanitarian] intervention has survived
in the express condemnations of intervention which have occurred in recent times or the
general prohibition of resort to force to be found in the United Nations Charter.");
BYERS, supra note 16, at 92-103 (reviewing cases of humanitarian intervention and
concluding that there is no right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention under
international law); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 128 (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) (1982) ("Neither human rights, democracy or selfdetermination are acceptable legal grounds for waging war, nor for that matter, are
traditional just war causes or righting of wrongs."); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN,
NATO, and InternationalLaw After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 70 (2000) (stating that
there is no right under customary international law or any treaty permitting a state to
undertake a humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization); see also
Bruno Simma, NA TO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 6
(1999) (concluding after analysis of the Charter that unauthorized humanitarian
interventions constitute violations of international law, but cautioning that any instance of
intervention requires consideration of not only the law but also the circumstances of the
particular case). The weight of opinion among states appears to fall against the notion of a
right to unauthorized humanitarian intervention. That most NATO member states did not
justify their intervention in Kosovo by reference to a general humanitarian exception to
Article 2(4), see W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing
and Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 79 (2008) ("[N]o major
participating government relied exclusively or primarily on some sort of theory of
humanitarian intervention, or on an international responsibility to act to arrest mass
killing.")-despite conditions that arguably would favor such an exception, such as the
growing humanitarian crisis in the region, a certain veto in the Security Council, and the
involvement of a regional organization rather than action by a single state-further
demonstrates the resistance of states to a rule allowing unauthorized interventions under
international law.
18. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. The Charter also provides that the General Assembly
"shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ...assisting in the
realization of human rights," id. art. 13, para. 1, and Chapter IX requires the United
Nations to "promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." Id. art.
55.
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express prohibition on the use by states of nondefensive force,' 9
indicates that the drafters of the Charter did not intend to allow
individual states, absent U.N. authorization, a right of humanitarian
intervention.
Proponents of a right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention
generally advance three arguments in opposition to the textually
focused classical view of international law.2' First, some scholars

contend that because Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force only
against the "territorial integrity or political independence" of a state,
unauthorized humanitarian intervention-which seeks neither

territorial nor political conquest of the target state-does not violate
the Charter. 21 This claim, however, is inconsistent not only with the
primary purpose of the Charter to limit the incidence of interstate
war, but also with the negotiating history of the instrument.22 During
their discussions on what would become Article 2(4), the drafters
sought to formulate language that would make clear that armed force
should not be used in the absence of U.N. authorization; smaller
states especially were concerned about strengthening the language in
19. This reading of international law relies on a narrow interpretation of Article 51.
For an alternative reading of Article 51 that holds that under a doctrine of "legitimate
defense," third-party nations have a right to defend national groups that are attacked, see
GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS
JUSTIFIED AND WHY 129-54 (2008).

20. See Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of HumanitarianIntervention, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 186 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
& David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
21. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 95 (1958);
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND

MORALITY 150-57 (1997); W. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian
Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). The United Kingdom used this line of
argument before the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the Corfu Channel case, in
which the Royal Navy undertook a sweep of Albanian waters in 1946 in response to an
incident in which two British vessels struck stray mines in the North Corfu Strait, resulting
in significant damage to both vessels and the deaths of forty-four men. See Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 10 (Apr. 9). The court determined that the United Kingdom
had violated Albanian sovereignty, but it also recognized "extenuating circumstances,"
including Albania's failure to investigate the mines after the Royal Navy vessels were hit,
and did not order any penalty against the United Kingdom. See id. at 35; see also FRANCK,
RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 184-85 (examining Corfu Channel as one example
of how a "penumbra of reasonableness" has developed to let "technically illegal but
morally justified" uses of force pass without rebuke).
22. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that (1) a treaty should be interpreted "in accordance with the
ordinary meaning" of the language in context and in light of the treaty's "object and
purpose" and (2) recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty is permissible when
interpretation based on the text, object, and purpose leaves the text ambiguous or results
in a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" result).
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order to express an absolute prohibition. The delegates explicitly
considered the prospect that some formulations of the provision
might be vulnerable to an interpretation that would allow the use of
force by a member state "in some manner consistent with the
purposes of the Organization" but without U.N. authorization.23 The
drafters believed that the reference to territorial integrity or political
independence protected against this possibility, and they further
expected that this additional language itself could not be used to

undercut the requirement of Security Council authorization.24 The
drafters of the Charter thus included the specification to strengthen
the prohibition on the use of force, not to restrict its application.25
Even if an intervening state does not seek to appropriate any territory
of the target state or change its political or government structure, its
use of force still constitutes a violation of Article 2(4).
Second, some scholars argue that when the Security Council fails
to realize one of its principal purposes, such as the protection of
human rights, the unauthorized use of force by member states is not
inconsistent with Article 2(4).26 This policy-oriented approach looks
23. U.N. Conference on Int'l Org., Comm'n I: Gen. Provisions, S.F., Cal., Apr. 25June 25,1945, Summary Report of Seventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INT'L ORG. [U.N.C.I.O.] 303, 304, Doc. 382

(May 17, 1945).
24. U.N. Conference on Int'l Org., Comm'n I: Gen. Provisions, S.F., Cal., Apr. 25June 25, 1945, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, in 6 U.N.C.I.O. 331,
334-35, Doc. 784 (June 5, 1945) [hereinafter U.N.C.I.O. Document 784]; see also U.N.
Conference on Int'l Org., Comm'n I: Gen. Provisions, S.F., Cal., Apr. 25-June 25, 1945,
Summary Report of Twelfth Meeting of Committee 1/1, in 6 U.N.C.I.O. 342, 342, Doc. 810
(June 6, 1945) (adopting provision unanimously).
25. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 266-68 (outlining discussion among drafters
indicating that "territorial integrity or political independence" was not intended to restrict
application of Article 2(4)); see also RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945, at 456-57 (1958)

(describing the drafters' interest in crafting an obligation that would be stronger than a
mere promise of states not to resort to military force to settle disputes); Oscar Schachter,
The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 648-49 (1984) (opining
that interpreting military action to protect human rights to be action not taken "against
the 'territorial integrity or political independence' "of a state is "problematic").
26. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in International
Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 279-81 (1985); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and SelfDetermination:Construing CharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 642 (1984) (noting
that if the United Nations operated according to the terms of its Charter, unilateral
recourse to force would be unnecessary). Michael Reisman argues that the security system
of the United Nations was created on the basis of a consensus between the permanent
members of the Security Council. Once that consensus broke down in the early days of the
organization, member states no longer had the opportunity that had been envisioned to
find recourse in the Council. As a result, unauthorized force by member states, which
would have been unnecessary in a properly functioning system, again became relevant and
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to the provisions of the U.N. Charter on human rights as well as the
quickly developing human rights law regime as evidence that use of

force for the protection of human rights is not prohibited in general.
If the Security Council fails to act, then members retain a
responsibility to protect human rights and may intervene even in the
absence of U.N. action.27 This interpretation, however, also fails to

reflect both the context of the use of force provision and the
negotiating history of the Charter. As a general matter, it disregards

the "presumption against self-help" that lies at the heart of the
Charter system as a whole.2 Further, like the reference in Article 2(4)
to "territorial integrity or political independence," the delegates who

were negotiating the text intended the phrase "or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" as a
reinforcement, not a limit, to the prohibition against the use of
force.29 With these two phrases, the drafters believed they had made
clear that unauthorized use of nondefensive force by a member state
was prohibited absolutely. Indeed, they rejected a proposal to include

separate language to that effect on the grounds that Article 2(4)
already made clear that force was permissible only in self-defense or
as authorized by the Council.3 °
Third, citing prior interventions such as NATO's Kosovo
campaign, the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, the Vietnamese

invasion of Cambodia, and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, some
argue that customary international law provides a right of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention.31 Neither sufficient state
lawful. See Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, supra;
Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:ConstruingCharterArticle 2(4), supra.
27. See Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in InternationalLaw, supra note
26, at 279-80.
28. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 275.
29. See U.N.C.I.O. Document 784, supra note 24, at 334-35; see also Simma, supra
note 17, at 2-3 (" '[O]r in any other manner inconsistent...' is not designed to allow room
for any exceptions from the ban, but rather to make the prohibition watertight.").
30. See U.N. Conference on Int'l Org., Comm'n I: Gen. Provisions, S.F., Cal., Apr.
25-June 25, 1945, Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, in 6 U.N.C.I.O.
387, 400, Doc. 885 (June 9, 1945).
31. See Richard B. Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a
Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR INTHE MODERN WORLD 229,
244-51 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Ruth Wedgwood, NA TO's Campaign in
Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 833 (1999); see also Wedgwood, supra, at 828 (arguing
that the Kosovo intervention may signal "the emergence of a limited and conditional right
of humanitarian intervention"). Some also contend that a right of humanitarian
intervention that existed before the Charter has been revived. According to this argument,
the extent to which Article 2(4) displaces customary law is dependent on the United
Nations responding properly to international crisis. If it fails to exercise its responsibility
for protecting human rights and maintaining international peace, states recover their
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practice nor opinio juris, however, exists to support this view. The
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") explained in Nicaragua v.
United States32 that "[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an

unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle
by other States, tend towards a modification of customary
international law.

' 33

Nonetheless, as in Nicaragua,states undertaking

humanitarian interventions "have not justified their conduct by
reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the
principle of its prohibition.,

34

Aside from the Kosovo campaign, the

intervening states in the cases listed above explained their actions not
as exercises of a right or principle of humanitarian intervention, but
rather as acts of self-defense; they chose to justify their uses of force
from within the framework of the Charter rather than to challenge its
application. 35 NATO also did not attempt to ground its intervention
in any right of humanitarian intervention; most member states
avoided asserting any legal justification at all, turning instead to
morality to defend the action36 and emphasizing repeatedly that the
intervention should not serve as a precedent for future action.37 Those
states that did cite a legal justification proposed that NATO's action

customary right of intervention and may resort to force even in the absence of Security
Council authorization. See, e.g., Reisman & McDougal, supra note 21, at 170-71
(discussing customary right of intervention and arguing that the creation of the United
Nations "neither terminated nor weakened the customary institution of humanitarian
intervention").
32. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id.
35. For a description of the Indian explanation of its resort to force, see NATALINO
RONZITI, RESCUING NATIONALS

ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND

INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 96-98 (1985). For a discussion of the
Vietnamese justification for war, see GARY KLINTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN
CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-33 (1989); SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 103-04 (1996).

On the-Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, see RONZrIl, supra, at 102-06.
36. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S[PV.3988 (Mar. 24,
1999) [hereinafter Security Council 3988th Meeting]. The day the air strikes began,
Germany, holding at that time the Presidency of the European Union ("EU"), stated in
the Security Council that EU members had a "moral obligation" to respond to the
humanitarian crisis. See id.
37. See 328 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 617 (statement of U.K. Defense
Secretary George Robertson) [hereinafter Robertson Statement], available at
http:/www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99899/cmhansrd/vo990325/debtext/9032533.htm#90325-33_spnew3 (describing the NATO intervention as "exceptional"); see also
Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the InternationalRule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
189, 203 n.78 (2006) (noting that, at times, states violating international law "have no
interest in diminishing the long-term value of the rule" they are violating).
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was an enforcement of prior Security Council resolutions.38 When
NATO states had to account for the intervention in the ICJ after

Yugoslavia initiated an action challenging the bombing campaign,
only Belgium articulated a legal right of intervention, 39 and even then

it later expressed its "hope that resorting to force without the
Council's approval will not constitute a precedent."' These cases
indicate that not only is "constant and uniform"41 state practice
lacking, but so is any sense that states undertaking humanitarian
interventions believe their conduct is in accordance with the law, as is
required to establish opinio juris 2 States that might have been acting
for humanitarian purposes appeared to judge that they could not base
their actions on a purported right of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention and did not seek to assert a new right so as to change the

law through practice. As a result, they instead turned to the reliable
rules of self-defense or neglected the law altogether. That the
majority of state opinion appears to weigh against a right of
intervention further weakens the argument. 3 These examples not
only undermine the theory that international legal rules prohibiting

the unauthorized use of force absent self-defense are "wither[ing]
away through long, total neglect," but also "reinforce [states']
commitment to those rules as binding."'

38. See Robertson Statement, supra note 37 (justifying intervention as a "measure in
support of purposes laid down by the UN Security Council"); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, at 4, 7, U.N. Doc. SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999) (statements of France
and Netherlands citing prior Security Council resolutions).
39. See Oral Pleadings of Belgium, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999
I.C.J. Pleadings 15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docketfiles/105/
4515.pdf (uncorrected translation).
40. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 14th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.14 (Sept. 25,
1999) (statement of Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium
Louis Michel).
41. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 20).
42. See Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93
AM. J.INT'L L. 834, 836 (1999) (finding few cases of states justifying actions based on a
right of humanitarian intervention); see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.;
F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (explaining that establishment of a rule as part
of customary international law requires settled state practice and "evidence of a belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it").
43. See infra note 84 (describing discussions in the United Nations on unauthorized
humanitarian intervention).
44. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 448
(2003) (reviewing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

(2000)).
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Looking Beyond the Law of Unauthorized Humanitarian
Intervention

The case under international law for a right of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention is quite weak; few scholars and few states
support the view that international law at this time allows states to
use force to protect human rights in the absence of Security Council
authorization. Faced with an apparently solid prohibition on the
unauthorized use of force for humanitarian reasons, policy makers
and scholars have struggled with how to address situations in which
humanitarian intervention appears appropriate and a state or group
of states are willing to use force to protect human rights, but the
Security Council will not authorize their use of force." To answer this
question, some have turned away from the prescriptions of the law.
The salient issue, they argue, is not simply what international law says
about the unauthorized use of force, but rather whether following the
law might be politically or morally unacceptable.46 This inquiry leads
to further discussion of whether unauthorized humanitarian
interventions should happen despite their illegality-and to what
consequences for the intervening state.
Taking this alternative perspective, a number of commentators
have asserted that in some cases, a state should undertake an
unauthorized humanitarian intervention even though Article 2(4)
prohibits such action. They have argued that the prohibition on the
unauthorized use of nondefensive force should remain in place, but
that in cases in which morality demands action, a violation of the law
against unauthorized intervention should be tolerated-or even
welcomed. 47 The resulting scholarship has looked to the criminal law
45. See, e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-22 (2001); FRANCK, RECOURSE TO
FORCE, supra note 4, at 188-89.
46. See Franck, Interpretation and Change, supra note 4, at 210-11 (exploring the
impact of "dissonance" between positive law and public perception of the law's fairness).
47. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 139 (taking the position that
unauthorized recourse to force must remain illegal, but "in ascertainable circumstances,"
the consequences of illegal action should be mitigated because the unlawful intervention
has "demonstrably prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong"); see also
SCHACHTER, supra note 17, at 126 ("[I]n the absence of [Security Council] prior approval,
a State or group of States using force to put an end to atrocities when the necessity is
evident and the humanitarian intention is clear is likely to have its action pardoned.").
Domestic criminal law has also been invoked in another theory of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention, this time relying on civil disobedience. The philosopher Allen
Buchanan has explored the opportunities for states to transform the law of humanitarian
intervention by undertaking illegal acts-that is, by undertaking unauthorized
humanitarian interventions. See Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of
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categories of excuse and justification

to frame

unauthorized

humanitarian intervention.48 While maintaining that international law

generally prohibits unauthorized humanitarian intervention and
should continue to do so, this approach-which I term the "criminal

law approach"-argues that in exceptional cases in which
intervention should take place but the Security Council refuses to act,
states should impose no (or only nominal) penalties on a state or
group of states that decides to use military force without U.N.
authorization.
The primary architect of the criminal law approach is Thomas
Franck, who drew on the writings of Oscar Schachter in developing
his work.49 Professor Franck argues that the hard cases-situations in
which a government is committing massive human rights abuses
against its people, diplomatic efforts have failed to stop the violence,
and a veto in the Security Council prevents the possibility of a
Council-authorized use of force°--should be situated within the law
rather than viewed strictly as violations. 1 For "technically illegal but
Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND

supra note 4, at 130, 132-33. Buchanan's proposal, however,
hinges on the assumption that states undertaking interventions indeed seek to reform the
law, see id. at 133, but this has not been the case in practice, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text. Moreover, in the paradigm case of civil disobedience, the law-breaker
violates the law and accepts punishment for her act. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 295 (5th ed. 2009). The punishment is key: " 'We must
pay a certain price to conviice others that our actions have ... a sufficient moral basis in
the political convictions of the community,' " according to John Rawls. See id. (quoting
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 367 (1971)). In the international system, however, it
is unlikely that the law-breaker will be subject to any punishment, given that interventions
are likely to be undertaken by powerful states, and powerful states are less likely to suffer
sanctions for their misdeeds. See Allen Buchanan, From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The
Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
POLITICAL DILEMMAS,

MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 123, 126 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).

48. See, e.g., Franck, Interpretation and Change, supra note 4, at 213; Richard V.
Meyer & Mark David "Max" Maxwell, The Natural Right to Intervene: The Evolution of
the Concepts of Justification and Excuse for Both State and Individual,7 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 555, 570-72 (2009).
49. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 181 (crediting Schachter for
the basis of the idea). For the position of other scholars in support of the criminal law
approach,

see JACK DONNELLY,

UNIVERSAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN THEORY

AND

PRACTICE 258 (2003) (describing Kosovo intervention as "the lesser of two evils" and
"tolerable, perhaps even excusable"); Simma, supra note 17, at 22; Jane Stromseth,
Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra

note 4, at 232, 243.
50. See Simma, supra note 17, at 22 ("[T]here do occur 'hard cases' in which terrible
dilemmas must be faced and imperative political and moral considerations may appear to
leave no choice but to act outside the law.").
51. See Franck, Interpretation and Change,supra note 4, at 214.

1292

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

morally justified actions, 5 2 the international community-acting as a
sort of jury through the mechanisms of the Security Council or
General Assembly 53-acknowledges the act as illegal, and because the
act remains illegal, the rule prohibiting the illegal act remains intact.5 4
But because of the unique circumstances that compelled the
intervening state(s) to undertake this illegal act, its illegality is set
aside, and no punitive action is taken in response to the breach.5
The primary benefits of the criminal law approach, according to
its proponents, are twofold. First, it preserves the integrity of the
prohibition against the use of nondefensive force; even though
particular breaches are not penalized, the law remains intact. 6
Second, it preserves the legitimacy of the law. This approach takes
the position that strict application of the law-which would yield no
military interventions in the absence of Security Council
authorization-produces an unacceptable result, and when the law
produces an unacceptable result, it risks losing its legitimacy. The
criminal law approach accordingly tempers the strict application of
the law with "considerations of moral legitimacy."5 7
Professor Franck sees this approach not only as normatively
desirable, but also as accurate in describing the practice of states in

52. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 184.
53. See Thomas M. Franck, Legality and Legitimacy in HumanitarianIntervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 143, 148, 151 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds.,
2006) (discussing "jurying" role of states in the U.N. system); Franck, Interpretation and
Change, supra note 4, at 212-31 (explaining the approach).
54. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 183-84 (noting that "formal
adjustment of the law" is not necessary because international law may accommodate
instances of noncompliance without changing the underlying rule); SCHACHTER, supra
note 17, at 126 ("[I]t is highly undesirable to have a new rule allowing humanitarian
intervention .... It would be better to acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary
and desirable in the particular circumstances than to adopt a principle that would open a
wide gap in the barrier against unilateral use of force."); see also Charney, supra note 42,
at 837 (arguing that there is no international consensus in support of a right of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention); O'Connell, supra note 17, at 81 (noting that
supporters of the criminal law approach do not advocate a universal doctrine of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention or an abandonment of the Charter use of force
regime).
55. Writers in the criminal law approach use a range of terminology, alternating
between describing interventions as excused, justified, mitigated, or necessary. For
discussion of the distinctions in the criminal law between these concepts and the neglect of
these distinctions in the criminal law approach to unauthorized humanitarian intervention,
see infra Part II.A.1-2.
56. See Stromseth, supra note 49, at 243 (identifying preservation of the legal rules
governing the use of force as one benefit of the excusable breach approach).
57. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supranote 4, at 185.
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past interventions.58 The international response to NATO's bombing

campaign in Kosovo is a favored example of the criminal law
approach. 59 Expecting that Russia and China would veto any
authorization of forceful intervention by the Security Council, NATO

states did not seek Security Council authorization for the use of force,
which they justified as a legitimate action in support of prior Security
Council resolutions and a moral imperative-but not an exercise of a
right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention.' In an emergency
session of the Security Council the day the bombing commenced,
Russia, China, Belarus, and India called the NATO intervention a
violation of the Charter,6" and Russia introduced a resolution
condemning the campaign and demanding an end to the air strikes.62
The Council rejected the draft by twelve votes to three, with only
Russia, China, and Namibia voting to support it. 63 Franck
characterizes the Security Council's refusal to condemn the NATO

intervention, despite its clear contravention of Article 2(4), as a
demonstration of states setting aside NATO's violation of the law. 6
Although the NATO intervention was clearly illegal, it was morally

justifiable: a massive humanitarian crisis was causing widespread
civilian suffering; the responsible parties refused to negotiate a
political settlement; and the Security Council failed to fulfill its

responsibility to act in the face of a clear threat to international peace
and security. Because of these unique circumstances, the international
community judged NATO's violation of the law to be excused or
justified.65

The 1990 intervention of the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") in Liberia also is cited as an example of

58. See Franck, Interpretation and Change, supra note 4, at 215-26 (describing the
operation of excuse and justification in past interventions).
59. See, e.g., id. at 224-26.
60. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
61. See Security Council 3988th Meeting, supra note 36, at 12-13 (statement of
China); id. at 13 (statement of Russia); id. at 15 (statement of Belarus); id. at 15-16
(statement of India).
62. See S.C. Draft Res., U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 21, 1999) (introduced by Belarus,
India, and Russian Federation); see also U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Security Council 3989th Meeting] (discussing the
draft resolution).
63. See Security Council 3989th Meeting, supra note 62, at 6; see also Press Release,
Security Council, supra note 38, at 1 ("Acting on a draft resolution submitted by Belarus,
Russian Federation and India, the Council failed to adopt it by a vote of 3 in favour
(China, Namibia, Russian Federation) to 12 against.").
64. Franck, Interpretationand Change, supra note 4, at 224-25.
65. See id.
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excuse or justification in action.66 After a failed coup attempt in late
1989 disintegrated into months of indiscriminate, pervasive violence
throughout the country, the sixteen-member organization decided to
take action-without the authorization of the Security Council.67 In
August 1990 it established a ceasefire monitoring force, the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group
("ECOMOG"),6 8 which deployed to Liberia later that month.69 The

deployment of ECOMOG was undoubtedly a use of force; although it
was technically organized as a traditional peacekeeping body,7"

ECOMOG aggressively used armed force in response to attacks,
conducted aerial bombing, and relied on heavy artillery and tanks.7

The Liberian factions agreed to a ceasefire in November 1990, and
fighting largely calmed for nearly two years.

The Security Council,

meanwhile, stayed on the sidelines and inserted itself into the matter
only to applaud the work of ECOWAS.7 3 When it first considered the

question of Liberia, in January 1991, the President of the Council
"commend[ed] the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and
Government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia."74 The

66. See, e.g., id. at 221-23.
67. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg. at 76, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3138 (Nov. 19,
1992) [hereinafter Security Council 3138th Meeting] (statement of U.S. representative)
("[T]he dispatch of peace-keeping forces to Liberia was a decision taken by the ECOWAS
Governments on their own initiative.
). By 1993, the fighting had resulted in some
150,000 casualties and the displacement of an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 Liberian
refugees to neighboring countries. See The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Question of Liberia, 8, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25402 (Mar. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Secretary-GeneralReport on Liberia].
68. See Econ. Cmty. of W. Afr. States [ECOWAS], Standing Mediation Comm., Final
Communiqu6 of the First Session, T 10-14 (Aug. 7, 1990), reprinted in REGIONAL
PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 72, 73
(M. Weller ed., 1994); ECOWAS, Standing Mediation Comm., On the Cease-fire and
Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, art. 2, Decision
A/DEC/.1/8/90 (Aug. 7, 1990), reprinted in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra, at 67, 67-68. The
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ("ECOMOG") did not
have permission to intervene from the Liberian government in place at the time. For
further discussion rejecting possible theories of authorization, see MURPHY, supra note 35,
at 160-62.
69. David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 157, 168
(Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
70. Id. at 167.
71. MURPHY, supra note 35, at 152.
72. See id. at 152-53.
73. See AREND & BECK, supra note 12, at 65 (describing the inaction of the Security
Council).
74. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991).
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Council did not express concern that ECOWAS member states had
resorted to force without U.N. authorization and instead broadly
supported the organization's initiative.75 Indeed, there was no
discussion of any breach of Article 2(4).76 To proponents of the
criminal law approach, the Security Council's reaction shows that
states allowed the violation of the law because of their sense that
there was a gap between what was required by the law and what was
required by "the common sense of moral justice."77 Because the
consequences of the ECOMOG deployment (a short-term ceasefire
and, with U.N. participation, an eventual peace) were preferable to
the presumed consequences of inaction by the international
community (continuing death and displacement with no foreseeable
end)78 the Security Council determined that the unauthorized use of
force should not be condemned or punished, despite its illegality.79
C.

Mapping Legality and Legitimacy in the Unauthorized
HumanitarianIntervention Debate:Sovereignty and Human
Rights

The criminal law approach, and its driving rationale that strict
application of the law must yield to considerations of morality, have
been well received not only in the academic literature, but also in
practice. Most significantly, the Goldstone Commission concluded
that the NATO air campaign in Kosovo was "illegal but legitimate"; 0
like the work of Professor Franck, the Commission lamented the "gap
between legality and legitimacy" that had developed in the area of
75. See, e.g., Security Council 3138th Meeting, supra note 67, at 66 (statement of
Russian representative) (noting the position that the Liberian crisis should be resolved on

a regional basis); id. at 76 (statement of U.S. representative) (expressing support for
ECOWAS intervention

even though it was undertaken

without Security

Council

authorization). The United Nations became more involved in the Liberian conflict only
after the ceasefire broke down in August 1992, as distrust by Charles Taylor toward
ECOMOG necessitated more active participation by the organization. See SecretaryGeneral Report on Liberia, supra note 67, 9128 (noting Taylor's concern that ECOMOG
was no longer a neutral force). It was only in November 1992 that the Council declared the

situation in Liberia a threat to international peace and security; at that time, however, it
again "commend[ed]" the efforts of ECOWAS in Liberia, and it did not authorize any
action. S.C. Res. 788, 1$ 1, 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
76.

See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 306 (2d

ed. 2004).
77. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 183--84.
78. See id. at 188 ("To consider a plea in mitigation of an otherwise unlawful act, it is

necessary to compare
circumstances.").

potential

outcomes

of

action

and

79. See Franck, Interpretationand Change,supra note 4, at 221.
80. Kosovo REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.

inaction

in precise
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unauthorized intervention. 8 This is not surprising; the criminal law

approach carries some obvious appeal. As a preliminary matter, using
criminal law concepts to characterize unauthorized interventions,
despite the notable distinctions between international and domestic
models explained below,' expresses that violations of the prohibition

against nondefensive force are public abuses that concern the
international community as a whole, not private matters that lie solely
between the intervener and the target state. 83 An absence of effective
law-enforcement mechanisms or avenues for punishment may
weaken the sense that violations of the Charter and customary
international law are affronts to the international community, but the
representation of such violations as having impact beyond the
particular states that are directly involved reinforces the central tenet84
of the international system that all states have an interest in peace.
Further, there is a readily apparent connection between the rules of
domestic law, in which members of society accept near-complete
restrictions on their right to use violence, with the paradigmatic
exception of violence used in self-defense, and those of international

law, in which states accept near-complete restrictions on their right to
use force, with the exception of force used in self-defense until the
Security Council intervenes.85

81. Id. at 10; see also FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 182 (explaining
that the Commission took a first step toward "bridging the gap ... between legality and
legitimacy, between strict legal positivism and a common sense of moral justice"). In
contrast to Professor Franck's approach, however, the Goldstone Commission urged that
this gap be closed by some process of amending the law to allow for lawful interventions
outside of the United Nations. See KosOvo REPORT, supranote 5, at 291.
82. See infra Part II.A.3-II.B.
83. See Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 12 (2002) (noting that addressing egregious violations of human rights through
private civil suits may suggest that only money and financial compensation are at issue and
reduces the matter to a private concern rather than one of the larger public).
84. Moreover, the criminal law approach is faithful to the state of international law in
that it acknowledges that unauthorized humanitarian intervention remains prohibited and
does not call for an amendment to the Charter that appears highly unlikely in light of the
opposition of the majority of states to a right of humanitarian intervention. See supra note
54. The debates in the General Assembly at the time of the Kosovo intervention show that
governments supported Council-authorized interventions in situations of humanitarian
crisis, but many states spoke out to oppose the notion that states could intervene without
Council authorization. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Debate Surveyed
Pros and Cons of Humanitarian Intervention, Globalization, Poverty, UN Reform,
Observes Assembly President, U.N. Doc. GA/SM/105 (Oct. 2, 1999).
85. For a discussion of the connection between self-defense in domestic criminal law
and in international law, see FLETCHER & OHLIN, supranote 19, at 129-54.
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The appeal of the criminal law approach, however, extends
beyond these two factors. The discourse of legality versus legitimacy

or legality versus morality that lies at the heart of the criminal law
approach reflects the predominant characterization of the debate
over unauthorized humanitarian intervention as a battle between
state sovereignty, which is characterized as an amoral ordering
mechanism, and the protection of human rights, the consummate
expression of morality in international life.86 Discussions of the legal
status of unauthorized intervention frequently begin with an
acknowledgment of the "disturbing tension" between these "two core
values of the international legal system,"87 and the question of

unauthorized intervention is seen as bringing the conflict between
these two values into stark relief.88 Advocates of a right of

intervention cast their arguments in terms of human rights versus
sovereignty, with the conclusion that human rights wins out.89 Under
an ethical theory of international law, Fernando Tes6n, for example,

reaches the conclusion that because the promotion of human rights
has primacy over the principle of respect for state sovereignty, the
prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4) is necessarily
qualified by the purpose of the United Nations of promoting and

86. See Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of HumanitarianIntervention
After Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323, 327, 329 (2002) (describing the predominant
account that the question of unauthorized humanitarian intervention centers on the
tension between sovereignty and human rights and that sovereignty has no moral basis,
while human rights is based on moral concerns). There are some exceptions to this type of
characterization. Terry Nardin, for example, advocates evaluating humanitarian
intervention by reference to the much older traditions of protecting the innocent and
punishing wrongs. See Terry Nardin, The Moral Basis for HumanitarianIntervention, in
JUST INTERVENTION 11, 11-28 (Anthony F. Lang Jr. ed., 2003). Anne Orford argues that
the predominant narrative of humanitarian intervention as a story of human rights
enforcement triumphing over the protections of sovereignty has been created to mask the
reality that the international community is complicit in the humanitarian crises to which it
responds. See ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2003).

87. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 131.
88. See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads,41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2000) ("When the Security Council fails to act to stop a
continuing humanitarian crisis, these two basic pillars of the post-World War IIlegal order
come into dramatic conflict."); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 104
(2001) (opining that the principle of respect for human rights "is, in fact, competing-if
not at loggerheads" with principles of sovereign equality and nonintervention in the
domestic affairs of other states); Mirko Bagaric & John R. Morss, Transforming
Humanitarian Intervention from an Expedient Accident to a CategoricalImperative, 30
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 421, 427-31 (2005) (discussing the conflict between human rights and
state sovereignty).
89. See TES6N, supra note 21, at 173-74.
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protecting human rights.' ° Unauthorized humanitarian intervention
is, therefore, consistent with the Charter.9 Opponents of a right of
intervention are seen to use the same inputs to come to a different
result, supporting their textual analysis with a heavy reliance on the
principle of nonintervention, a corollary of state sovereignty.92 The
conclusion is that although human rights protection is important, it
cannot withstand the prohibitions imposed by state sovereignty and
the accompanying nonintervention norm.93
When debates about humanitarian intervention are cast in these
terms, as a choice between saving states or saving lives, discussions of
what factors may justify an unauthorized intervention take the form
of inquiries about what degree of suffering may justify an intrusion or
conditioning of sovereignty, or whether military force will accomplish
its stated goal of ending the human rights abuse.94 These questions are
undoubtedly important, but they fail to account for another
dimension of unauthorized intervention-its impact on restraints of
power and the operation of law. The following two Parts turn to those
questions.
II. A CHALLENGE

TO THE CRIMINAL LAW APPROACH TO
UNAUTHORIZED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The criminal law approach to unauthorized humanitarian
intervention provides a seemingly elegant model. For those who take
the position that international law prohibits unauthorized uses of
nondefensive force and believe that the law should continue to do so
despite the existence of cases in which it produces unacceptable
results, the criminal law approach allows a state both to disregard the
law and to escape sanction for its breach. At the same time, this
approach preserves the operation and integrity of the prohibition
against unauthorized force. This Part investigates the application of
the criminal law approach, and it argues that upon deeper inspection,
the criminal law approach is neither an apt descriptive model for past
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Ulrich K. Preuss, The Force, Frailty, and Future of Human Rights
Under Globalization, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 284 (2000) (opining that state
sovereignty has prevented the enforcement of human rights norms); Nicholas Tsagourias,
HumanitarianIntervention and Legal Principles, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 83, 83 (2001)
(explaining the debate over humanitarian intervention as a disagreement regarding
whether state sovereignty or human rights is the guiding principle of legal reasoning).
92. AREND & BECK, supra note 12, at 131-32.
93. See, e.g., id. ("In order to buttress their argument that humanitarian intervention
is not legal, restrictionist scholars invoke the principle of 'non-intervention.' ").
94. See id. at 128-29.
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interventions nor an appropriate normative framework to guide
evaluation of future interventions.
A.

The DescriptiveFailuresof the CriminalLaw Approach
This sub-Part contends that the criminal law approach is

untenable as a description of the international community's past
practice in unauthorized humanitarian intervention. In order to
explain why this is the case, it is necessary to examine briefly the
criminal law defenses of excuse and justification and the application
of these defenses by the criminal law approach in the context of

unauthorized humanitarian intervention. This sub-Part then turns to
an exploration of why the criminal law approach fails to accurately

theorize past cases of unauthorized humanitarian intervention.
1. A Brief Overview of Excuse and Justification
Although many courts and legislators have failed to acknowledge
that justification and excuse are two distinct concepts,9 5 both have
benefited from deep scholarly investigation, and the differences
between the two are now well settled.96 A justification defense applies
to conduct that otherwise would be unlawful, but that under the
circumstances is "socially acceptable" and therefore not unlawful.97
Justified conduct is consistent with the rules that the law seeks to

guide behavior and thus is "to be encouraged (or at least tolerated) in
the future."98 An application of the justification defense to the case of
95. See Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the
CriminalLaw: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 6566 (1984) (discussing conflation of the terms "excuse" and "justification" and other
misuses thereof).
96. The literature on excuse and justification is vast; Professors George Fletcher and
Paul Robinson especially have illuminated the dark corners of the two defenses. See
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23
UCLA L. REV. 293 passim (1975); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal
Harm as a Prerequisitefor CriminalLiability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 passim (1975). Given
the relatively simple analogy drawn by the criminal law approach, a detailed examination
of these defenses is both unnecessary to and beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly,
this sub-Part provides only a brief discussion so as to allow for further discussion of the
applicability of the criminal law approach to unauthorized humanitarian intervention.
97. Peter D.W. Heberling, Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on
Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 916 (1975).
98. PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1997);
see also DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 208 ("A justified act is one that 'the law does not
condemn, or even welcomes.'"
(quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (1968))). The U.N. Charter's

law of self-defense can be thought of as a codification of a justification. Using force in
response to the occurrence of an armed attack is justified and thus not unlawful.
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Kosovo would say: although NATO's military campaign would
otherwise be unlawful because it violated Article 2(4) of the Charter,
under the circumstances-the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo,
the urgent need for action, and the certainty that the Security Council
would not act-the intervention was "socially acceptable" and
therefore not unlawful.
Whereas justification focuses on the nature of the act, an excuse,
in contrast, looks to the circumstances faced by the actor and serves
as a defense in cases in which the actor cannot be held to be morally
culpable for the wrongful conduct committed.99 An excuse defense
does not deny that the actor has committed the act in question or that
the conduct has harmed society; the defense lies in the absence of
moral blameworthiness in the defendant for undertaking that conduct
and causing the harm. A defendant may have committed a criminal
act, but because she is insane, or undertook the act involuntarily, for
example, the defendant is not criminally responsible for the act;
excuses are "variations of the theme 'I couldn't help myself' or 'I
didn't mean to do it.' "" Professor Fletcher keenly describes three
categories of excuses: (1) necessity as a result of natural conditions
(for example, a starving man who steals a loaf of bread); (2) coercion
or duress as a result of intimidation exerted by another person (an
actor who steals because a gunman threatens to kill him if he does
not); or (3) distortion in the actor's conduct as a result of her own
psychological or physical make-up (an actor who cannot control her
movements because of an epileptic seizure)." 1 Of course, none of
these three categories fits the type of explanation that would suit a
case of unauthorized humanitarian intervention, but putting that
aside for further discussion below,1" an application of the excuse
defense to the Kosovo intervention would say: although NATO
member states committed a wrongful act by violating Article 2(4) of
the Charter, the intervening states are not morally culpable for their
wrongful conduct because they could not help but act.
Although exploring the distinctions between excuse and
justification might appear to be quibbling over minor details, there
are significant differences between the two defenses. First, because
justified conduct is lawful conduct and excused conduct remains
99. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 205 (explaining excuse defenses).
100. George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1269, 1269 (1974).
101. Id. at 1269-70.
102. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing applicability of criminal law definitions of excuse,
justification, and necessity to unauthorized humanitarian intervention).
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unlawful despite its failure to result in criminal liability, and because
the law seeks to encourage (or at least tolerate) lawful conduct and
deter unlawful conduct, whether conduct is excused or justified
impacts how the law guides the conduct of other actors. If the Kosovo
campaign was justified, then another actor in the same position as one
of the intervening states in the future would be legally entitled to
make the same decision to intervene. If NATO was excused for
conducting the Kosovo campaign, in contrast, then another actor in
the same position as one of the NATO states in the future would not
legally be entitled to undertake the same conduct. The distinction
also impacts the message the law sends about the conduct. Does the
conduct align with what is normatively expected or acceptable, or
does it deviate from those norms? Was the actor reasonable in
undertaking the conduct, or was it attributable to some disability or
impairment? 3 Accordingly, how the criminal law approach navigates
these murky waters is especially important.
2. Excuse and Justification in the Criminal Law Approach
Instead of describing unauthorized humanitarian intervention as
either justified or excused, the criminal law approach alternates
between these two categories; unauthorized
humanitarian
interventions are in some writings portrayed as "illegal but justified"
and in others "illegal but excused."'" Indeed, the approach appears to
combine elements of the two categories. On the one hand, the
criminal law approach regards as significant that an excused or
justified unauthorized intervention remains illegal. This aspect looks
like excuse: while justified conduct is legal conduct, excused conduct
is illegal, but because of the circumstances faced by the actor, no
criminal liability attaches. 0 5 On the other hand, the factors that, to
103. These questions have been explored in fascinating scholarship on battered
women. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral
and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 461 passim
(1996); Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the
DistinctionBetween Justificationand Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45 passim.
104. See, e.g., Franck, Interpretation and Change, supra note 4, at 213 (alternating
between discussions of justification, excuse, and mitigation).
105. See Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 89, 91 (explaining that "warranted action" is the

"central feature of justification," while "nonresponsibility" is the "central feature of
excuse"); Donald L. Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 109, 119 ("To recognize a justification

defense is effectively to change the law ....
For if a person in a given situation is justified
in doing an act that would otherwise be denominated criminal, then all others similarly
situated are likely privileged to do the same act.").
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proponents of the criminal law approach, make the unlawful conduct
unworthy of sanction suggest that justification is at work. These
factors concern the nature of the act, not the vulnerable
circumstances of the actor: NATO was justified in intervening in
Kosovo, for example, because of the degree of suffering that the

United Nations was failing to stop-not because it could not help but
initiate a bombing campaign.
Despite the vast differences between justification and excuse,
ultimately the precise category of defense appears less important to

the proponents of the criminal law approach than the concept of
necessity, a "choice of evils" defense." 6 At first glance, this defense

appears consistent with the predominant narrative of the problem of
unauthorized intervention: a state is forced to choose between taking
action to prevent or stop massive violations of human rights and
violating international law in doing so, or continuing to abide by the
law and allowing the atrocities to continue or even increase. 0 7 Other
conditions of the necessity defense also appear to be met by a case of
unauthorized intervention that the criminal law approach would
consider appropriate for tolerance: the intervening state or group of
states must reasonably expect that intervention will avert the harm
being suffered in the target state, and there are no available legal
alternatives because the Security Council will not act. 0 '
The crucial factor that makes necessity inapplicable to
unauthorized intervention, however, is foreseeability. Circumstances
106. See Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1348-49 (1989) (discussing
distinction between necessity, properly understood as a justification defense, and duress,
properly understood as an excuse).
107. As Anne Orford notes, discourse about humanitarian intervention "always
[focuses] on the moment when military intervention is the only remaining credible foreign
policy option," resulting in a false sense that the "choice facing the international
community in security or humanitarian crises is one of action"-and specifically the use of
armed force-"or inaction." ORFORD, supra note 86, at 14-18. Her observation of the
action/inaction dichotomy applies not only to scholarly debates about humanitarian
intervention but also to the discourse of statesmen: during the Kosovo campaign, Tony
Blair repeatedly represented inaction as the only alternative to military intervention. See
Tony Blair, A New Generation Draws the Line, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19,1999, at 40 ("Others
argue we should not have acted at all. Of them I ask, what was the alternative? To do
nothing would have been to acquiesce in Milosevic's brutality."); see also Tony Blair,
There Is No Compromise... We Will Win, SUNDAY MIRROR (London), Apr. 11, 1999, at
4 (voicing concern over the damage that would have resulted if NATO "had done
nothing").
108. See MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS, CASES,
AND CONTROVERSIES 267 (2006) (explaining the requirements for a necessity defense
under criminal law).
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that are apt for a necessity defense require that "lawmakers must not
have previously 'anticipated the choice of evils and determined the
balance to be struck between the competing values' in a manner in
But the problem of
conflict with the defendant's choice."'"
intervention without Security Council authorization was foreseeable.
Indeed, the drafters of the U.N. Charter considered whether to allow
states a right to intervene without Security Council authorization in
order to protect human rights, and they determined that force should
be allowed without Security Council authorization only in the case of
self-defense.11 ° The primary rules governing the use of force thus
already take into account considerations of necessity; the drafters of
the Charter codified a justification of self-defense in Article 51 and
chose to exclude other reasons that states might use force.111 The
structure of the criminal law doctrine of necessity therefore would not
characterize unauthorized intervention as a proper case of necessity.
The concept of necessity under existing international law also
fails to shed much light on the operation of the criminal law
approach. 12 According to the International Law Commission ("ILC")
Articles on State Responsibility, necessity "preclud[es] the
wrongfulness of an act." 3 The ILC also alternates between using
language of justification and excuse to describe necessity.1 4 During
the drafting process, ILC members discussed the distinction between
a defense that precludes the wrongfulness of an act, and one that
mitigates responsibility, and they settled on the former, which
suggests that necessity under international law constitutes a

109. DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 292-93 (quoting State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946
(N.J. 1986) and citing Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453, 455 (Mass. 1993)).
110. The drafters not only decided not to include an exception for humanitarian
intervention in Article 2(4), but also debated whether to allow regional organizations a
right to intervene without Security Council authorization and decided against it. See
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 157-58.
111. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
112. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, paras. 140-42 (July 9) (recognizing the
existence of a doctrine of necessity in international law); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92, paras. 49-59 (Sept. 25) (same).
113. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 25, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the
Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC 2001 Report], available at http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf. The International Law Commission adopted the Draft Articles as
final in 2001, and the General Assembly approved them that same year. See G.A. Res.
56/83, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
114. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 160-62 (2002).
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justification.115 At the same time, James Crawford, the Special
Rapporteur on State Responsibility, concluded that it is not clear
whether the ILC considered the enumeration of circumstances
precluding wrongfulness to be a justification or an excuse, but he
suggested that the Commission meant to preclude responsibility
rather than wrongfulness, which looks more like excuse.'16

Whether necessity as a matter of international law may be
applied to unauthorized humanitarian intervention is an equally
murky question. Although the ILC Articles provide that necessity
may only be invoked where an unlawful action is "the only way for
the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril," the ILC notably did not specify that the "essential
interest" being protected must be that of the intervening state."' The
commentary to Article 25 notes that "necessity consists not in the
danger to the lives of individuals in the charge of a State official but in
a grave danger either to the essential interests of the State or of the
international community as a whole.""' 8 At the same time, the ILC
determined that necessity may not be invoked where the unlawful
conduct "seriously impair[s] an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole,""' 9 raising the question of whether a military

intervention can be reasonably characterized as conduct that does not
impair the essential interest of the target state, and, further, whether
that unlawful conduct impairs the interests of the international
community in light of the absence of Security Council authorization.
Further complicating the question of the applicability of necessity
under international law is the provision that necessity may not be
used to preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that violates a
peremptory norm of international law, 20 which suggests that necessity
2
may not be applicable to unauthorized humanitarian intervention.' '
Moreover, the ILC noted in its 2001 commentary that "considerations

115. Id. at 209.
116. See James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 435, 443-44 (1999).
117. ILC 2001 Report, supra note 113, at 49.
118. Id. at 195; see also Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its
Thirty-second Session, Commentary, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) art. 33, para. 23, U.N.
Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprintedin [1980] 2 (Part Two) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 34, 44, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (observing that necessity has applied in cases of "grave
and imminent danger to the State, to some of its nationals or simply to human beings").
119. ILC2001 Report, supra note 113, at 49.
120. See id. at 53.
121. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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akin to those underlying Article 25 may have a role" in evaluating

cases of unauthorized humanitarian intervention but that primary
22
rules on use of force already take those considerations into account.
On balance, it appears that as a matter of international law, necessity
is not available as a defense for a breach of Article 2(4) undertaken to
protect human rights.
3. The Practice of Excuse and Justification in International Affairs
The success of the criminal law approach need not depend

exclusively on its ability to fit the practice of humanitarian
intervention neatly into the categories of either the criminal law or
international law. But the criminal law approach also fails to fit the

reality of past practices of humanitarian intervention, contrary to its
proponents' claims. The criminal law approach offers an unsatisfying
description of the international community's approach to
unauthorized humanitarian intervention on account of the
fundamental differences between the institutions and practices at

work in the international system and those operating in the domestic
criminal justice system. In order to assess that an unauthorized
intervention is viewed as excused or justified in accordance with the
criminal law approach, there must be some clarity that the law has
been broken-even if that breach is deemed not to merit
condemnation or sanction. This clarity could originate in a judgment
by the ICJ or, conceding that non-judicial international bodies could

act as judges or juries,123 a declaration by the Security Council or the
General Assembly. But such determinations of illegality are rare.
Because of severe restraints on its jurisdiction, the ICJ only

infrequently becomes involved in adjudicating a state's use of force.124

122. CRAWFORD, supra note 114, at 186.
123. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Franck's writing on the
jurying function of the Security Council and General Assembly).
124. The Kosovo intervention provides a unique case in which the ICJ did have a role,
but even then, because of jurisdictional barriers, the court did not make a final judgment
on the legality of NATO's use of force and noted only that it was "profoundly concerned
with the use of force in Yugoslavia" and that "under the present circumstances, such use
raises very serious issues of international law." Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.),
1998 I.C.J. 124, 132 (June 2). The orders issued in the other nine cases are identical mutatis
mutandis. In recent years, the ICJ has taken up cases on uses of force in non-humanitarian
contexts. See, e.g., Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19) (holding that military operations by Uganda in the
Democratic Republic of Congo violated Article 2(4) of the Charter, as well as
international human rights and humanitarian law, and ordering the government of Uganda
to pay reparations); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 160 (Nov. 6) (holding that
U.S. Navy attacks against Iranian oil platforms in 1987 and 1988 constituted an unlawful
use of force but did not violate a 1955 commerce treaty between the two countries).
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The prospect of jurisdiction in the International Criminal Court over
the crime of aggression could provide another opportunity for judicial
evaluation of unauthorized humanitarian intervention, but this is
contingent both on the Assembly of States Parties reaching a decision
on the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction and on the considerable political hurdles likely to arise in
the face of a potential action against an intervening state.125 As for the

political bodies, the Security Council and General Assembly often
choose not to address questions of the legality of a member state's
debate, those
actions, 126 and when they do discuss such matters during
127
assessments are often mixed with political judgments.
These same factors result in the second failure of the criminal
law approach: the absence of any articulation of the factors that may
justify or excuse the illegal conduct. Without a court judgment or any
consensus on the part of the international community, the
international system lacks a mechanism for pronouncing why
particular violations of the law are released from sanction. In the case
of Kosovo, for example, which Professor Franck cites as an example
of the criminal law approach in action, it is clear that the international
community chose to tolerate the intervention rather than subject
NATO member states to any type of sanction. But it is not clear that
states regarded the intervention as justified because of the
circumstances that Franck cites-" [e]xtreme necessity" in the form of
severe humanitarian crisis; "immediacy of the need for action"
because violence was increasing; the "clean hands" of the NATO
states; and the U.N. system's inability to act. 12 For example, some
scholars and observers believed that the Muslim states that supported
125. Although aggression is included in the list of crimes over which the court has
jurisdiction, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, adopted July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, the exercise of jurisdiction is conditioned on agreement by the
Assembly of States Parties on a definition of the crime and on the conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Crime of Aggression: Adding a
Definition to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 12 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Nov. 18,
2008), http://www.asil.org/insights08lll8.cfm. The Assembly of States Parties will hold its
first Review Conference in 2010. See id.
126. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 135-40 (discussing the Council's failure to
discuss violation of Article 2(4) in the context of the regional intervention in Liberia).
127. During the Kosovo debate, delegates from Russia, China, Belarus, and India each
declared that the intervention was a violation of the Charter, see supra note 61 and
accompanying text, and some states voiced their unease about the use of force absent
Security Council authorization, see U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc
S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999) (statement of Brazil); U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg.
Resumption 1 at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999) (statement of Costa Rica), but
most states did not take a position one way or the other.
128. Franck, Interpretationand Change, supra note 4, at 226.
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the NATO campaign in Kosovo did so not because they saw the
intervention as legally defensible as a result of the factors cited above,

but rather because this particular use of force was being directed to
protect fellow Muslims.

129

Slovenia, too, was similarly focused on

concerns other than the standard defenses for intervention. In
rejecting the draft Russian resolution, which is regarded under the
criminal law approach as a representation of the international
community accepting that the violation of the law was excused or
justified, Slovenia focused on the fact that the resolution lacked

sufficient mention of the abuses of the Yugoslav government. 13 0 More
generally, Nicholas Wheeler points to what he terms the "shaming

power of humanitarian norms" as an explanation for states' support
of operations such as the Kosovo campaign."' States suffer political
costs as a result of opposing powerful "global humanitarian values"

that shape their reactions to humanitarian interventions; as a result,
these reactions are likely to be unaffected by states' assessments of
the

legality

of those

interventions. 3 2 Thus, because

political

judgments can be mixed with legal ones, or at times overtake them
entirely, a state's acquiescence in an illegal act does not necessarily

point to an assessment that the illegal act was justified under the
circumstances. 3 3
129. See Roland Dannreuther,

Perceptions in the Middle East, in KOSOVO:

PERCEPTIONS OF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 206, 206-08 (Mary Buckley & Sally N.

Cummings eds., 2001) (describing rationale for positions of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
United Arab Emirates). Malaysia was expected to abstain in the vote on the Russian
resolution condemning the intervention, but it voted against it. See Security Council
3989th Meeting, supra note 62, at 8-9. In the explanation of vote, the Malaysian
representative expressed his "wish[] that the crisis in Kosovo could have been dealt with
directly and in an effective manner by the Security Council," but declared that in light of
the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, he "had no other option but to vote against the
draft resolution." Id.
130. See Security Council 3989th Meeting, supra note 62, at 3; see also N.D. White, The
Legality of Bombing in the Name of Humanity, 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 27, 33
(2000) ("[A] major concern for many states voting against the resolution was its lack of
balance in that it failed also to condemn the brutality of the repressive measures taken by
the [Former Republic of Yugoslavia].").
131. See NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 290-91 (2000).
132. Nicholas J. Wheeler, The HumanitarianResponsibilitiesof Sovereignty: Explaining
the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for HumanitarianPurposes in
International Society, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
RELATIONS 29, 39 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).

AND

INTERNATIONAL

133. That the NATO member states did not concede that their own actions were
unlawful further complicates the attempt to interpret other states' reactions to the
intervention. As Jane Stromseth explains, NATO states argued that the intervention had
"a legal basis within the normative framework of internationallaw." Stromseth, supra note
49, at 244. As discussed above, the Netherlands, for example, defended its participation in
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The same problems arise upon a closer examination of the

Liberia intervention, which Franck also sees as an example of the
international community tolerating a violation of the law because of
exceptional conditions-widespread violence that demands action,
Security Council inaction, and clean hands on the part of the
intervening states. 34 The Council indeed (1) failed to condemn
ECOWAS's violation of Article 2(4) and (2)

"commend[ed]"

ECOWAS's intervention, including the military efforts of
ECOMOG.13 5 But it is a different matter to assert that the Council
acknowledged a breach of Article 2(4) and determined that under the
circumstances, the breach should be condoned. The Security Council
debates at the time, as well as those of the General Assembly, show

support of the ECOWAS intervention, but they do not reveal
member states' positions on Article 2(4) and Security Council
authorization.13 6

It is not clear why this intervention was condoned. It is possible
that states in the Council chose to tolerate the intervention, and even
validate it, because they recognized the existence of particular
conditions that they deemed a valid defense for a violation of the

Charter, an explanation supported by Professor Franck. 137 Another
possible answer, as noted by Sean Murphy, is that at the time that
ECOWAS established and deployed a peacekeeping force to Liberia,

the international community was focused on Iraq's invasion of
the bombing and its vote against the Russian resolution on the grounds that the
intervention "follows directly from [R]esolution 1203," Security Council 3989th Meeting,
supra note 62, at 4, in which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, affirmed that
the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to international peace and security and
demanded that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia take certain steps
to resolve the crisis there. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998). The
same problems have arisen in past interventions. India, Tanzania, and Vietnam, for
example, characterized their interventions in neighboring countries not as humanitarian
actions, but as self-defense. See AREND & BECK, supra note 12, at 119 (describing India's
" 'reali[zation] that humanitarian intervention was an insufficient justification for the use
of force'" (quoting Michael Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, 5
INT'L REL. 3, 12 (1977))). As a result, it is impossible to assess whether the international
community's responses in those cases represent examples of its reaction to humanitarian
interventions, to stretched interpretations of self-defense, or to those interveners' selfinterested motives cloaked in the language of self-defense. See id. at 121-22 (describing
Vietnam's characterization of its intervention in Cambodia as self-defense); id. at 125
(discussing Tanzania's justification of its intervention in Uganda on self-defense grounds).
134. See Franck, Interpretationand Change, supranote 4, at 221-23.
135. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (describing Security Council
reaction to ECOMOG intervention).
136. See MURPHY, supra note 35, at 163.
137. See Franck, Interpretation and Change, supra note 4, at 223 (stating that the
"reality" of the Liberia intervention is "simpler" than some scholars would have it).
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Kuwait, which had taken place earlier in the same month.'38 Even if
U.N. member states were troubled by the unauthorized use of force
in Liberia, they were willing to let it pass not because they believed
the unique circumstances of the violence in Liberia warranted it, but
simply because the world was otherwise occupied. Another possibility
is that the international community did not think the intervention was
illegal, perhaps because the use of force was undertaken through a
sub-regional organization.139 The accuracy of any one of these
possible explanations, however, is not apparent from proceedings
taking place within the United Nations or from other statements in
response to the intervention. To describe this as a case of the
international community excusing or justifying a violation of the law
because it determined that violation to be moral or legitimate is, at
best, a guess. 140 The only clear conclusion from the ECOWAS
intervention is that the international community was willing not only
to condone, but also to commend, the intervention of a regional
organization in an internal violent conflict without authorization of
the Security Council.
B.

The Significance of the DescriptiveFailures

The success of an analogy to domestic law also need not rely on a
precise replication of domestic law mechanisms in the international
system, of course. 14' Accordingly, it is important to explore whether it
is significant that in the international system there generally is no
acknowledgment of a violation of the underlying rule or of the
circumstances that merit tolerance of a violation. In the criminal law
system, such an acknowledgment is crucial to the purpose of
justification or excuse. When a defendant who has committed a
homicide is acquitted because she acted in self-defense, the trial
138. See MURPHY, supra note 35, at 163 (noting a connection between the
international community's "almost universally favorable" reaction to the ECOMOG
intervention and the Kuwait invasion); see also STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF
ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN
AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 86 (1999) (noting that the possibility of U.S. intervention in Liberia

was foreclosed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).
139. See MURPHY, supra note 35, at 163.
140. Franck, in contrast, asserts that "[t]he political organs have demonstrated their
ability and readiness, when faced with states' recourse to force, to calibrate their responses
by sophisticated judgment, taking into account the full panoply of specific circumstances."
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 4, at 186.
141. Indeed, the operation of the domestic law mechanisms is at times muddled as well.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the
Criminal Defenses: The Significance of Justification,77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277,
282-90 (1986) (proposing a third category of "justified wrong[s]").
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court's presentation of facts relating to that defense, the jury
instructions provided on self-defense, and an appellate court's review
and determination of whether the facts of the case support a selfdefense justification all serve the function of preserving the root
prohibition against homicide and providing for a public accounting of
what the law prohibits and what it allows. Without an articulation of
the circumstances that support acquittal, the integrity of the
prohibition would suffer, but because the particular conditions that
justify the conduct or excuse the actor for undertaking that conduct
are explored and elaborated, it is clear that it is not homicide that is
being tolerated
by the law, but only homicide under those particular
142
conditions.
In the international law system, too, an articulation of illegality
and of the circumstances that are significant to merit a defense are
also crucial if the criminal law approach is to succeed in its goals to
(1) preserve the integrity of the prohibition, and at the same time (2)
preserve the integrity of the law overall. The criminal law approach
seeks to accomplish these aims by offering a legal framework under
which unlawful conduct is tolerated because of certain circumstances,
but the conduct remains unlawful, as opposed to a framework in
which the law is amended to affirmatively permit that conduct under
those circumstances. Vaughan Lowe helpfully characterizes the
distinction as follows:
[O]ne might impose a strict speed limit but give the authorities
the discretion not to prosecute, say, a driver who breaks the
speed limit in order to take an emergency patient to [the]
hospital. Alternatively, one might prescribe a speed limit but
make the obligation to obey the limit subject to a qualification
allowing drivers to break the speed limit in cases of necessity.
Both save the emergency driver from conviction for breaking
the law; but it is entirely possible that the second approach
leads in practice to
much wider disregard of the speed limit
143
than does the first.
Lowe is correct to point out that this is an empirical question,
and the specific question of whether affirmatively allowing states a
right of humanitarian intervention would lead to abuse of that right
142. General verdicts may raise a similar problem. See Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1913 (1984)
("Whether [excuse and justification] are overlapping or alternative, a general verdict will
fail to reveal the basis for the jury's judgment if it has considered both defenses.").
143. Vaughan Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility:A Pleafor Excuses, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 405,409-10 (1999).
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has been deeply explored in the literature.'" The more significant
point for this Article is that to reap the benefits that may result from
using a system of prosecutorial discretion (or in the case of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention, political expressions of
tolerance) rather than one that builds exceptions into the obligation
itself, there must be some way for the system to recognize both that
the conduct is prima facie unlawful and that the unlawful conduct is
tolerated because of unique circumstances. If unauthorized
humanitarian interventions take place without any acknowledgment
of their illegality, the prohibition against the unauthorized use of
nondefensive force will weaken. This is not only because cases of
states breaching the Charter with no consequence may impact other
governments' sense that they must comply with the rules of
international law,145 but also because violations of international law
contribute to the law's shaping over time. This is not to suggest that
the mere practice of unauthorized intervention can, without more,
become customary international law; only opinio juris may transform
a set of practices into a part of customary international law. 4 6 But if
states were to frequently undertake unauthorized interventions (and
characterize them as humanitarian interventions, not as self-defense
or as lawful enforcement of Security Council decisions'4 7 ), this could
lead to some disintegration in the sense that the rule that states must
not use force is a legal obligation. Because states are both subjects of
international law and creators of international law, an act of
noncompliance functions both as a breach of the rule and as a

144. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
144-45 (2d ed. 1979) (" '[H]umanitarian intervention' can too readily be used as the
occasion or pretext for aggression."); Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen,
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 21, at 139,
147-48 ("Whatever special cases one can point to, a rule allowing humanitarian
intervention, as opposed to a discretion in the United Nations to act through the
appropriate organs, is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to
hegemonial intervention."); Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The
Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 304 (1973)
("[A] law derived from the Bangladesh precedent is an unlimited fiat for larger states to
oppress their smaller neighbors."). But see Ryan Goodman, HumanitarianIntervention
and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 107 (2006) (questioning the assumption that
states will use a right of humanitarian intervention as a pretext for self-interested war).
145. See Cogan, supra note 37, at 194 (discussing "inadequacies in how the
international community creates, internalizes, and manages the rules" and their role in
noncompliance).
146. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.; F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
44 (Feb.20).
147. See supra note 133 (discussing states' justification of their unauthorized

humanitarian interventions as self-defense).

1312

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

potential basis for a new rule. Thus, the first goal of the criminal law
approach-to preserve the prohibition on the use of force-is not
well served by the application of the approach in practice.
In addition to possibly weakening the prohibition against the use
of nondefensive force, the criminal law approach to unauthorized
intervention-in the form in which it usually operates in practice, that
is, without any clear statement on either the illegality of the act or the
circumstances that render the act unworthy of penalty-also may
impact the integrity of international law. Discussing the costs of
noncompliance with international law, Jacob Katz Cogan explains
that a breach of international law undermines the international rule
of law in two ways. First, noncompliance "impinges on the principle
that power must be exercised in accordance with the law."' 48 Second,
noncompliance weakens international actors' habit of complying with
the law, and thereby unsettles the assumption that states must comply
with the law.'49 If the breaches at issue were recognized as illegal and
absolved from penalty or condemnation as a result of specific,
exceptional circumstances, the same result might not obtain. But
because of the infrequency of deliberation and judgment on these
matters in authoritative institutions such as courts, the criminal law
approach fails in its goal to preserve the legitimacy of the law by
bridging a gap between what is legal and what is right. Instead, the
criminal law approach sets up a system in which what is law is
irrelevant, and the determinants of what is right are unclear at best.
C.

Questioning the CriminalLaw Model for Unauthorized
Intervention

The previous two sub-Parts discussed the operation of the
criminal law approach to humanitarian intervention in practice and
concluded that it fails to accurately characterize previous instances of
humanitarian intervention and offers little hope of achieving its stated
goals of situating exceptional cases of breach into the law so that the
underlying prohibition against unauthorized intervention remains
intact and preserving the legitimacy of the law. The weaknesses of the
criminal law approach, however, are not limited to its failure to
accurately characterize past instances of humanitarian intervention or
to its awkward attempt to map domestic law structures onto a quite
different international system. Even if the international arena evolved
to encompass a court system that evaluated every purported case of
148. Cogan, supra note 37, at 203.
149. See id. at 203-04.
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unauthorized force, and even if states used opportunities in
institutions like the United Nations to assess the legality of uses of
force and the existence of excusing or justifying conditions, the
criminal law approach still advocates a troubling framework for
thinking about unauthorized humanitarian intervention. The deeper
problem of the criminal law approach lies in its failure to account for
the systemic considerations that are crucial to international law and
that are jeopardized by unauthorized humanitarian intervention.
The excuse and justification defenses focus exclusively on
considerations that are unique to the particular situation that is being
judged by the criminal law. Justification looks to the nature of the act
and questions whether particular circumstances operated to
transform the act from one that is wrongful into one that is
tolerable.15 ° Excuse looks to the situation of the actor and questions
whether particular circumstances operated to transform the actor
from a person who is blameworthy for her act into one who is not."'
By answering the question of whether the international community
should condone an illegal humanitarian intervention by reference to
considerations such as the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the
failure of the United Nations to act, the criminal law approach adopts
the basic inquiries of criminal law defenses that emphasize the nature
of the act and the character of the actor. But judging an unauthorized
humanitarian intervention by reference to the situation of the
particular act and the particular actor necessarily ignores the impact
on the structure of international society that results when a state
chooses to contravene Article 2(4) and pursue an unauthorized use of
force against another state. Justification defenses do look to
consequences of an act, but this examination is limited to direct
results; longer-term, deeper impact on society and the law does not
figure as readily into determining criminal culpability and
punishment.
The criminal law approach seeks to find a "way out of the
conundrum" in which only noncompliance with the law leads to a
result that is "just and moral.' 52 In defining what is "just and moral,"
however, this approach imports the relevant considerations of the
criminal law, which fit well the predominant characterization of
unauthorized intervention as a matter of the conflict between human
rights and sovereignty, while distracting the debate from other aspects
150. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
152. Franck, Interpretationand Change, supra note 4, at 214.
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of the international system that are implicated when the international
community condones an unauthorized use of force. The following
Part argues that any discussion of unauthorized intervention must pay
greater attention to the systemic aspects of intervention, and
particularly to those elements of the U.N. system that serve to
constrain states' exercise of power under a system of law.
III. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
UNAUTHORIZED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

This Part argues that discussions of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention have been unduly limited to inquiries regarding the
particular intervention at hand and would benefit from greater focus
on the systemic impact of the international community's tolerance of
unauthorized uses of force. First, this Part examines two principles of
the U.N. system-the sovereign equality of states and the
concentration of force in the Security Council-that are jeopardized
by unauthorized humanitarian intervention. Next, this Part discusses
why this impact on these two structures is significant. This Part then
turns to explaining how the approach presented in this Article
comports with constructivist theories of international law that
examine how norms shape state behavior.
A.

Neglected Principles of the U.N. System: Sovereign Equality and
Security Council Control over Armed Force

1. The Concept and Consequences of Sovereign Equality
The principle of sovereign equality of states finds expression in
the U.N. Charter as the first among a set of principles on the basis of
which the United Nations and its members must act.'53 Although they
did not define the principle in the Charter, the drafters understood
the concept to mean (1) that states are "juridically equal"; (2) that
every state "enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty"; (3) that the
153. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members."); see also Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 124, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) ("All States enjoy sovereign
equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international
community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other
nature."). For a discussion of the roots of the concept of sovereign equality and its
operation in the international system, see generally ROBERT A. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1974).
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personality, territorial integrity, and political independence of each
state is respected; and (4) that every state must "faithfully" fulfill its
international obligations.1 54 Commentators frequently criticize the
emptiness of the concept of sovereign equality, pointing to obvious
imbalances in political power or economic might to illustrate the
155
pervasiveness and depth of inequality in the international system.
That the veto power in the Security Council is allocated to only five
states is cited as one of the most glaring examples of the absence of
equality in the U.N. system; 15 6 sovereign equality appears to be
merely a "utopian description of a world-to-be in which all states are
1 57
equal in power and well-being.
The principle of sovereign equality, however, is distinct from
political equality. Sovereign equality refers to equal status before the
law, not to equal political power. In fact, in advocating for acceptance
of the principle in the eighteenth century,158 Emmerich de Vattel
sought to consolidate in the legal framework of interstate relations a
concept that would protect republican states that had less political
power than the monarchies that might make claim to them. 159 A
154. U.N. Conference on Int'l Org., Comm'n I: Gen. Provisions, S.F., Cal., Apr. 25June 25, 1945, Report of Rapporteurof Committee I to Commission I, in 6 U.N.C.I.O. 446,

456-57, Doc. 944 (June 13, 1945).
155. See, e.g., Dino Kritsiotis, The Power of International Law as Language, 34 CAL.

W. L. REV. 397, 400 (1998) ("[W]e do indeed live in an Orwellian world in which all states
are equal, but in which some states are more equal than others."); Thomas H. Lee,
International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality of
Sovereign Equality Today, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 147, 147

("Whatever the general merits of the norm, its retention seems fairly open to question
when one sovereign state appears supremely unequal among 191 sovereign states ....
").
156. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, Pressurefor Security Council Reform, in THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 341, 351 (David M.

Malone ed., 2004) (noting that many governments oppose the veto as a "violation of the
principle of sovereign equality among states").
157. Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law:
Hegemony or Pluralism?,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691, 725 (2004).
158. See M. D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS,

§§ 18-19, at 52-53 (Northampton, Mass., Simeon Butler 1820) (1758), quoted in Lee, supra
note 155, at 150 ("A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is as much a
sovereign state as the most powerful kingdom. From a necessary consequence of this
equality, what is permitted to one nation is permitted to all and what is not permitted to
one is not permitted to any other.").
159. See Lee, supra note 155, at 150-54 (explaining the normative agenda of theorists
who advocated the principle of sovereign equality). Although sovereign equality typically
is presented as a corollary of the principle of state sovereignty that has formed a defining
feature of the international system since Westphalia, the rough equality of states around
the time of Westphalia was a de facto characteristic of the European powers rather than a
legal principle. See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 11-12, 30 (2004) (explaining the
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principle of sovereign equality surely would not balance the power of

republican states with that of monarchies, but it would provide those
more vulnerable states with protection from intervention."6
Sovereign equality also is distinct from equality of the law. 6 ' The

principle does not require that all states possess equal rights and
duties under international law, but rather holds that all states,
regardless of their economic or military power, enjoy equal capacity
to possess rights and duties under international law, even if ultimately
the rights and duties allocated under international law vary from state

to state. 62 This is why, as Hans Kelsen explained in his 1944 study of
sovereign equality, published shortly after the United States, United
Kingdom, China, and Russia had declared their joint intention to
establish a "general international organization, based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states,"1 63 customary
international law imposes distinct obligations on certain categories of
states that that do not apply to others. 164 Treaty law, moreover, is
international law, and different states have different rights and
165
obligations under treaty law.

In addition to dictating that states have equal capacity to attain
rights and duties under the law, sovereign equality further provides
that all sovereign states are equal before the law in that they are
equally bound to follow the law."6 It is this aspect of sovereign

equality that is most pertinent to the question of unauthorized
common conception that Westphalia effected a transformation of the international system
from hierarchy to equality).
160. See Lee, supra note 155, at 152 ("State autonomy, or the norm of domestic nonintervention, was an important corollary to Vattel's conception of sovereign equality in
the service of republican preservation." (footnote omitted)).
161. See Ulrich K. PreuB, Equality of States-Its Meaning in a Globalized Legal Order,
9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 17, 24 (2008).
162. See Michel Cosnard, Sovereign Equality-"The Wimbledon Sails On," in UNITED
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 121
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (noting that sovereign equality "is an equality
before the rule, not within the rule").
163. Declaration of Four Nations, supra note 9, at 756.
164. See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for
InternationalOrganization, 53 YALE L.J. 207, 209 (1944) ("But even according to general
customary international law, all the States have not the same duties and rights. A littoral
State, for example, has other duties and rights than an inland State.").
165. See id. at 208-09 (noting that treaty law results in a "great diversity" in states'
rights and duties).
166. See Hidemi Suganami, Grotius and International Equality, in HUGO GROTIUS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 221, 222-25 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992) (explaining
that "most fundamentally," sovereign equality means that states have an equal obligation
to obey international law); see also U.N. Charter art. 25 (declaring that all U.N. members
are equally bound by decisions of the Security Council).
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humanitarian intervention. The equal-duties sense of sovereignty is
"absolutely essential to a stable society of nations.' 16 7 If states are not
equal before the law, they are not equally required to comply with
international law. Without equal application of the law, international
law would be reduced to an exercise of power.168
Discussions of sovereign equality often focus on the principle's
impact on smaller states; without a principle that guarantees that 1all
69
states are juridically equal, small or weak states would not survive.
The relation of the sovereign equality principle to powerful states,
however, has been subject to far less exploration. Because of its
significance that all states are equally obligated to follow
international law, sovereign equality operates to exert a restraining
force over powerful states or those otherwise inclined to violate
international law. Accordingly, when a state violates the law, it is
declaring itself not bound to follow the law to the same degree as
other states, and, especially if there is no acknowledgment of or
consequence for the breach, the principle of sovereign equality is
necessarily eroded. Unauthorized humanitarian intervention is a
practice by states of exempting themselves from international law.
Accommodation of this practice recognizes the validity of a state's
choice to consider itself unbound by the restraints of the U.N.
Charter's rules on the use of force and accepts a system of inequality
of states within the international system. Moreover, validation of this
practice by attempting to situate it within the legal categories of
excuse or justification puts a label of legal legitimacy on an exercise of
power.
2. Military Force as an Instrument of the Community
As discussed in detail above, the U.N. Charter empowers the
Security Council with control over the use of armed force by states,
except for uses of force in self-defense. 170 The Charter's rules on the
167. EDWIN DEWITr DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 335 (1920).
168. See DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 137 (2002) ("If states were not treated as equals, ...

[rnights of weaker states could be infringed on the basis that the law does not fully apply in
their cases, or more powerful states would claim immunities from prosecution due to their
'special case' situation.").
169. See REIN MOLLERSON, ORDERING ANARCHY: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 121 (2000) (describing sovereign equality as "instrumental for

the emergence and survival of healthy but not physically.., strong states").
170. Even then, the Charter protects a state's right of self-defense in the event of an
armed attack only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51.
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use of force are often presented in the literature as being connected,
above all, to the principle of sovereign equality: because states are

juridically equal to one another, one state may not use force against
another. 7 ' This characterization, however, only reflects how the

Charter's use of force regime (as well as the sovereign equality
principle) serves to promote the intention of the creators of the
United Nations to limit the incidence of interstate war.'72 It also
reflects a decision about the proper normative basis for using military
force.
The decision of the drafters to vest in the Security Council
control over the nondefensive use of force signifies a determination to
change the character of military force by preventing states from
resorting to arms to pursue national interests. By entrusting the
collective with the use of nondefensive force, the drafters of the
Charter sought to ensure that war would be undertaken only for the
common good; a use of force that did not further the community
interest would presumably not be authorized by the Council. 173 In
accepting the Charter framework, the international community
expressed its support for the idea that a state may not wage war to
"defend its own parochial understanding of justice"; instead, "states
must persuade others of their just cause.' 1 74 The prohibition against
the use of nondefensive force is therefore not simply an ordering rule,
but instead reflects a normative goal of the drafters of the Charter: to
171. See M1JLLERSON, supra note 169, at 289 ("The Charter norms on the use of force
are premised on the principle of sovereign equality of states."); Bardo Fassbender, The
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 575, 583 (1998) (noting that the prohibition against the use of force
protects sovereign equality).
172. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (setting forth the aim of U.N. member states to "save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which ...has brought untold sorrow to
mankind").
173. See id. (including among purposes of creation of the United Nations "to ensure...
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest"); STEPHEN C. NEFF,
WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 281 (2005) ("Police actions by the Security Council
would be just wars of the purest kind, for the countering of aggression and the upholding
of community values.").
174. ALEX J. BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 230 (2006); see
WILLIAM D. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 91 (1966) ("[T]he

attempt to establish a collective security system ... indicates that men realize that the use
of force for nondefensive purposes can no longer be a typical tool of statecraft. It
expresses a growing attitude that the nondefensive use of force is incompatible with the
general aim of world peace. In representing the aspirations of leaders and in providing a
veneer of symbols and procedures to which leaders feel compelled to pay at least lipservice, the United Nations is itself a symbol of the universally held inhibitions against the
nondefensive use of force.").
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change military force from an instrument of national will to one of
international will.

This conception of the proper basis for using force was not new
to the United Nations. The Western just war tradition'75 includes

among its inquiries whether a war is undertaken by a "right
authority."' 7 6 In early just war thinking, authority to resort to war was
granted by God and rested in the sovereign.'77 That belief gradually
evolved from a theological matter to a legal and political one. 7 8 By

the end of the Middle Ages, sovereignty continued to rest in the
sovereign prince, but his authority derived from the community,
rather than from God. 179 The idea that only a legitimate authority can

wage war originated not only in an interest in limiting the recourse to
war by disapproving of force used by private actors for the purpose of
preserving order in society,18 but also in a moral interest in ensuring

175. The Western just war tradition typically focuses on six considerations-just cause,
right intention, reasonable prospects for success, last resort, proportionality, and right
authority-but there are many other formulations of this list. See BRIAN OREND, WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 48-50 (2000). For an overview
of Western just war thinking, see generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:
A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977) and PAUL RAMSEY,
THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY (1968). For discussions of the

application of just war theory to humanitarian intervention, see Mona Fixdal & Dan
Smith, Humanitarian Intervention and Just War, 42 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 283
(1998). For non-Western perspectives on just war, see, for example, TORKEL BREKKE,
THE ETHICS OF WAR IN ASIAN CIVILIZATIONS (2006) (studying ethics of war in six Asian
religions) and PAUL ROBINSON, JUST WAR IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2003)

(examining a range of religious and secular just war traditions).
176. See OREND, supra note 175, at 49 ("A state may go to war only if the decision has
been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made
public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s)."). Right authority is
traditionally understood as a component only ofjus ad bellum (law governing the resort to
war), but there are strong arguments for including this principle in discussions of jus in
bello (law governing the conduct of warfare) as well. If part of the rationale for limiting
just war to a rightful authority is to reduce the incidence of war because of its
destructiveness, then rightful authority for the conduct of war may have an equally
significant role to play in just war thinking's jus in bello analysis.
177.

See JOHN MARK MATrOX, SAINT AUGUSTINE AND THE THEORY OF JUST WAR

32 (2006).
178. See A.J. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR 125 (1997) (explaining the transformation
in the concept of right authority).
179. See JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF
WAR: SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS 242-43 (1975).

180. See COATES, supra note 178, at 125 (explaining that the just war tradition sought
to "curb the easy resort to violence" by "upholding the 'public' character of war and by
outlawing 'private' warfare"); John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War
Tradition, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 221,248 (2004); see also BELLAMY, supra note 174, at 48
("Although private wars continued well into the eighteenth century, they diminished
significantly from the fourteenth century onwards.").
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Accordingly, the

sovereign declaring war had rightful authority only if the war
represented the common good of the people. Power alone, without
this moral component, would fail to rally the support of the peoplewhich is necessary in order to successfully prosecute the war-but
beyond that, according to Saint Augustine, an early writer on just
war, it would fail to reflect "the natural order" in which citizens of a
state must perceive their leader as devoted to their care."
The moral conception of right authority faded from view
beginning in the seventeenth century, as the formal concept of
sovereignty became the automatic answer to the substantive inquiry
of whether a state had proper authority to use force. 183 Because warmaking was understood as an inherent accompaniment of
sovereignty, just war thinkers began to give only cursory treatment to
the question of right authority, assuming a linkage between state
sovereignty and authority that neglects the question of rightness.TM
The U.N. Charter, of course, put an end to the system in which

181. COATES, supra note 178, at 127-28.

182. Hartley S. Spatt, Faith, Force, or Fellowship: The Future of Right Authority, in
RETHINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION 205, 206 (Michael W. Brough et al. eds., 2007)
(quoting 35 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 83 (Thomas R. Heath trans.,

Blackfriars ed., 1972)). Augustine argued that soldiers did not sin when they carried out an
order to use violence because they were acting to "promot[e] the common good."
BELLAMY, supra note 174, at 28.
183. See Coverdale, supra note 180, at 249 (discussing the decline of a moral
conception of legitimate authority). Indeed, the general concept of justice in war was
relegated to the background as state sovereignty became the primary organizing principle
of society. To the extent that just war theory played a role in uses of force, it was as a
result of its incorporation into international law. See Michael Walzer, The Triumph of Just
War Theory (and the Dangers of Success), 69 SOC. RES. 925, 927 (2002) ("The princes of
the world continued to defend their wars, using the language of international law, which
was also, at least in part, the language of just war.").
184. See Spatt, supra note 182, at 206 ("The rise of the nation-state ...led to an
unfortunate decoupling of authority, which became linked to de jure state sovereignty,
from rightness, which became marginalized as an affair of the Church or of philosophers,
not necessarily of the state."). One exception to this general paucity of discussion on right
authority is writing on the subject of nonstate actors and terrorism. Alex Bellamy puts
forward three requirements for a nonstate actor to demonstrate that it is a rightful
authority under just war theory:
First, non-state actors must demonstrate that they enjoy high levels of support
within a readily identifiable political community. Second, they must demonstrate
that their constituents share their political aspirations and endorse the strategy of
violence. Finally, they must pass an instrumental test by showing that they are
capable of controlling their members and making and upholding agreements with
others.
BELLAMY, supra note 174, at 138 (internal citations omitted).
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sovereignty carried an unimpeded right to use force, as it required
member states to limit their lawful use of unauthorized force-that is,
force without the authorization of the international community,
attained through the Security Council-to self-defense.'85 Scholars
and practitioners considering an application of just war thinking to
contemporary problems concerning the use of force now conclude
that right authority requires action by the Security Council rather
than individual states. 86
The Charter, however, did not simply transfer the legal
entitlement to use force from individual states to the United Nations.
It also revived the just war notion that force should be used only in
the common interest. It is this function of the Charter that is
jeopardized by unauthorized humanitarian intervention. Armed
intervention that takes place outside the authority of the Security
Council cannot be presumed to be in the common interest, as an
intervention that is authorized by the Council can. Conceding that the
Security Council suffers from significant failures in representation
that demand reform, 87 it still provides a mechanism, even if only a
rough one, for distinguishing actions that are consistent with
community interests from those being undertaken to pursue national
policy. Taking force outside the hands of the Security Council, as
unauthorized humanitarian intervention does, allows for the reintroduction of a system in which unilateral interests may suffice to
justify war, and in which power dominates legal order.
B.

ConsideringSystemic Factorsin Unauthorized Humanitarian
Intervention

1. The Gaps in the Criminal Law Approach
The central problem of unauthorized humanitarian intervention
is how to confront cases in which the law demands one result, no
military force without Security Council authorization, but justice or
morality requires another, doing something instead of doing nothing.
The paradigm case is one in which a permanent member of the
185. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. art. 51.
186. See, e.g., INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, at XII (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]
(discussing right authority by reference to Security Council authorization for force).
187. See BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF
VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 197-207
(1998) (analyzing the
representativeness of Security Council membership in terms of population, territorial size,
economic strength, and contributions to the United Nations).
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United Nations threatens a veto not because of principled reasons
relating to the use of force, such as a belief that diplomatic options
have not yet been fully explored or that military force will not
succeed in stopping the atrocities that are being addressed, but
instead because of factors unrelated to the merits of the intervention,
such as the permanent member's economic interests in the target
state. 188 In such a case, the criminal law approach supports framing a
state's unauthorized use of force as tolerated by the law.
The above discussion of the systemic factors that are impacted by
cases of unauthorized humanitarian intervention shows the
narrowness of the criminal law approach. Because it is based on a
system for determining the criminal liability of a defendant for a
particular act, and thus examines a single instance of conduct rather
than considering the systemic consequences of that conduct,
evaluations of what justifies or excuses an intervention despite its
illegality are limited to inquiries into the immediate roots and
consequences of the proposed intervention-the inaction in the
Security Council, the scale of the humanitarian crisis, and the
likelihood that intervention can stop the crisis-and the larger impact
of the proposed intervention is ignored. This larger impact, however,
should be considered. If unauthorized humanitarian interventions are
presented by scholars and policy makers as tolerated by the law, the
values of sovereign equality and force as a community instrument are
relegated to subordinate status within the international system.
Condoning a decision of a state to exempt itself from the law and to
use military force as an expression of unilateral interests shifts the
normative basis for international society from legal order to power.
To evaluate humanitarian intervention without attention to this
impact would result in reversion to a system of power politics.
2. The Gaps in Other Frameworks for Intervention
Admittedly, the purpose of the criminal law approach is to
develop a legal framework for conceptualizing illegal acts that are
nonetheless "legitimate" or "moral"; it does not aim to theorize the
factors that render an unauthorized intervention legitimate or moral,
beyond listing them and looking to criminal law analogies for
188. It is widely expected that because of the billions of dollars that Beijing has
invested in Sudan's oil industry, any prospects for aggressive U.N. military intervention in
Darfur are rendered impossible by a certain Chinese veto. See, e.g., Mark Lange, The Only
Way to Alter China's Hand in Darfur, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 30, 2008, at 9
("Since China wields veto power on the United Nations Security Council, no serious
multilateral sanctions, arms embargo, or effective military intervention can happen.").

20101

RESTRUCTURING THE DEBATE

1323

guidance. This task, however, has been taken up by others. A wide
range of actors, from governments to scholars to nongovernmental
organizations, have enumerated parameters that should be used to
guide determinations of whether a state's unauthorized humanitarian
intervention should be tolerated by the international community.
Major efforts to craft criteria that could justify an unauthorized
intervention in recent years include the work of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,'8 9 the Danish
Institute of International Affairs, 9 ' and the Goldstone Commission.'91
Each project focuses on the particular circumstances of the
humanitarian crisis and the anticipated intervention. Jane Stromseth
describes the typical components of these lists:
a threshold or triggering set of circumstances (such as severe
human rights abuses leading to loss of life on a large scale, and
an unwillingness or inability of the state in question to halt the
abuses); a requirement that the Security Council be unable or
unwilling to take action; a requirement that force be necessary
to halt the abuses; that the force used be proportionate to the
end of halting the atrocities; and that the law of armed conflict
be complied with. To guard against abuse, additional criteria
sometimes (though not always) are articulated, including that
the intervention be multilateral, perhaps by a regional
organization; and that the motivation (or at least the goals and
the effects) be primarily humanitarian in nature.9

189. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty requires: (1)
just cause for intervention, in the form of large-scale ethnic cleansing or loss of life; (2) a
primary purpose of the intervening state(s) to stop or prevent the ethnic cleansing or loss
of life; (3) use of the minimum scale, duration, and intensity of force necessary to stop or
prevent the crisis; (4) exhaustion of all non-military options for prevention or resolution of
the crisis; (5) a reasonable prospect that military intervention will succeed in stopping or
preventing the crisis; and (6) consideration of the matter by the General Assembly or
action by a regional organization. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 186, at
32-37, 53-55.
190. The Danish Institute proposes that "legitimate humanitarian intervention"
requires: (1) serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law; (2)
failure by the Security Council to act; (3) multilateral action; (4) the use of necessary and
proportionate force; and (5) "disinterestedness" of the intervening states. See KOSOVO
REPORT, supra note 5, at 192-93.
191. The Goldstone Commission argues that "legitimate humanitarian intervention"
requires (1) "serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law," or
civilian suffering (or risk thereof) as a result of state failure; (2) force directed only to the
protection of the suffering population; (3) "necessary and proportionate force"; (4)
exhaustion of non-military measures; and (5) multilateral action. See id. at 192-95.
192. Stromseth, supra note 49, at 258. The United Kingdom proposed that
humanitarian intervention should be guided by the following principles: intervention
should occur only in the case of an "overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe"; armed
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Like the criminal law approach, these inquiries fail to illuminate

the impact of unauthorized uses of force on the international system's
efforts to restrain exercises of power by states. The requirement of
multilateral action approaches a consideration of whether force is
being used for unilateral purposes or in support of the interests of the
international community, but multilateralism is at best a rough proxy
for wider support. Regional organizations may well consist of states
that pursue the same political goals and have the same economic or
political orientations and motives. That the Kosovo intervention, for
example, was multilateral did not save it from widespread
accusations
193
reasons.
self-interested
for
undertaken
was
it
that
3. Assessing an Intervention's Impact on Sovereign Equality and the
Use of Force in the Common Interest
The next time the international community struggles with the
question of whether a state or group of states should undertake a
military campaign to protect human rights, how can it give due
consideration to the systemic factors this Article highlights? In order
to properly weigh the impact of an unauthorized humanitarian
intervention on sovereign equality and community control of force,
this Article proposes that parties who seek to judge an unauthorized
intervention must be a last resort, and it must be "objectively clear" that there is no
alternative to the use of force to save lives; any use of force must be proportionate to
achieving the humanitarian purpose and carried out in accordance with international law;
and interventions should be carried out with Security Council authority, and if not
possible, should be undertaken by a coalition of states rather than by individual states. See
Robin Cook, U.K. Foreign Sec'y, Guiding Humanitarian Intervention, Speech to the
American Bar Association (July 19, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/
en/newsroomlatest-news/?view=Speech&id=2148757). Jules Lobel proposes that the
inquiry could be limited to four simple factors: (1) whether the situation has been
condemned by the Security Council as "a threat to peace" under Chapter VII; (2) whether
the Council is paralyzed by a veto and the action is being taken by a regional organization
that says it is "intervening to protect human rights"; (3) the Security Council is
subsequently silent or refuses to condemn the intervention; and (4) peaceful options have
been exhausted. See Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19, 29 (2000). Lobel also points out the weakness of this
framework, including its failure to answer who decides whether a situation is so dire as to
necessitate military force. See id.
193. See, e.g., ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 149 (2008) (arguing that NATO commander General
Wesley Clark saw the Kosovo intervention as an "opportunity to demonstrate NATO's
continuing relevance in a post-Cold War world"); Richard Falk, Humanitarian
Intervention After Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOvO: THE DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION 31, 35 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003) (noting the role of "strong
independent pressures to endow NATO with renewed credibility and meaningful security
roles" in NATO's decision to intervene in Kosovo).

2010]

RESTRUCTURING THE DEBATE

1325

intervention-whether states, scholars, or policy makers-should
approach the question of intervention in three new ways.
First, consideration should be given to why the Security Council
has not authorized the intervention at issue. This inquiry may reveal
whether the use of military force is directed to the self-interest of the
intervening state(s) or to the protection of the community that is
vulnerable to or the victim of mass atrocity. NATO, for example,
undertook the Kosovo intervention not only without Security Council
authorization, but without seeking Council authorization because it
anticipated a Russian veto.194 Had the United States or United
Kingdom decided instead to bring to a vote a resolution authorizing
intervention, the states supporting intervention would have had the
opportunity to explain their position that intervention in Kosovo did
not merely serve their interests or those of NATO as a collective
security or political organization, but instead would benefit and
protect the interests of the international community. Moreover, it
could have forced Russia to exercise, explain, and defend its veto,
allowing the international community a greater opportunity to
evaluate whether the Security Council was deadlocked because of
substantive disputes over the content of the nonintervention
principle, disagreements as to the likely consequences of an
intervention, debates about whether all other options for resolution
of the conflict had been exhausted, or simply power politics. A
greater understanding of the source of disagreement within the
Council would help to illuminate the rationale for NATO choosing to
undertake the intervention despite the lack of Council authorization.
Second, there should be greater investigation of whether there
are other expressions by the international community that suggest
that the unauthorized intervention may represent the common
interests of the community. Although the system of Security Council
authorization for the use of force was intended to ensure that armed
force would be undertaken by states only in the common interest, a
lack of Security Council authorization is not necessarily evidence that
a use of force is not in the common interest. A majority vote in the
Council in favor of intervention, even if the approval is ultimately
blocked by a veto, might indicate the degree to which states believed
the use of force was in the interests of the international community.
The General Assembly also can be crucial in this regard.195 After a
194. See Steven Haines, The Influence of OperationAllied Force on the Development of
the Jus ad Bellum, 85 INT'L AFF. 477, 477 (2009).

195. Although the Charter grants the Security Council "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security," U.N. Charter art. 24, the General
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state or group of states fails in an attempt to seek Council
authorization for a use of force, it could turn to the General
Assembly for approval under the 1950 "Uniting for Peace"
resolution. 196 Although the Assembly does not have the power to
authorize a state to use force, 197 the support of two-thirds of the

General Assembly for a resolution backing an unauthorized
intervention would serve as an indicator of a wide sense that the
198
intervention serves the interests of the international community.
Third, all actors should use the opportunities available to them to

identify an unauthorized intervention as a violation of the Charter.
As discussed in Part II, declarations of illegality are rarely

forthcoming in the international system, but this is not because of an
absence of forums for evaluation. The Security Council and General
Assembly are indeed political bodies, but states may still recognize

Assembly may address questions relating to international peace and security, see id. art.
11, as long as the Security Council is not seized of the matter at the time, see id. art. 12.
The General Assembly, however, may only make recommendations, with binding
decisions reserved to the Council. Compare id. art. 11 (granting the General Assembly
recommendatory power), with id. art. 39 (granting the Council power both to make
recommendations and to decide what measures will be taken to restore international
peace and security).
196. The General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950 in the
midst of a Security Council deadlock over the question of collective action against North
Korea. The General Assembly decided that
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or
act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
G.A. Res. 377 (V), 1 1, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3,
1950).
197. See Marc Weller, Forcible Humanitarian Action: The Case of Kosovo, in
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 277, 326

(Michael Bothe et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that based on the text of the U.N. Charter
and previous practice, the General Assembly has only powers of recommendation and
cannot authorize states to use force).
198. NATO states apparently opposed the idea of taking the question of intervention
in Kosovo to the General Assembly, reportedly due to their fear that they would not have
been able to get the votes of two-thirds of the member states. See U.K. HOUSE OF
COMMONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, KOSOvO, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1999-

2000, H.C. 28-I, at 98 (statement of Adam Roberts recalling that the Foreign Office said
his suggestion of using the Uniting for Peace procedure for Kosovo "was not very helpful"
and proposing that the Foreign Office opposed the idea because of its belief that the
requisite votes were unlikely and because of procedural inflexibility in the Assembly).
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the legal status of the actions of their fellow members. Advocates and
scholars, too, have wide opportunities to pronounce that
of their
unauthorized humanitarian interventions-regardless
merits-are violations of the Charter and customary international
law. Recognizing the illegality of those actions reinforces the fact that
international law does apply to all states. Although the criminal law
approach reveals some of the difficulties of drawing guidance for
interstate relations from criminal law, one principle worth borrowing
is that the integrity of the criminal law is not necessarily weakened by
violations because those violations are addressed. Similarly, if
violations of international law are confronted, even if only through a
declaration of illegality without any accompanying sanction, the
participants in the international system affirm the continuing
relevance of international law as a primary gauge for the acceptability
of a use of force. Instead of amorphous considerations of legitimacy
or morality dominating the debate, questions of legality take on a
central focus.
Incorporating concerns about sovereign equality and the
requirement of a "common interest" for the use of military force into
decisions about humanitarian intervention may impact the practice of
unauthorized intervention in two ways. First, if states and other
observers emphasize the question of the legality of an unauthorized
intervention, would-be interveners may be more likely to justify their
decision to intervene not in terms of those amorphous considerations
of legitimacy or morality, but rather by reference to the institutions
on the basis of which they are being evaluated. Assessment of
interventions in terms of Security Council authorization and
adherence to Article 2(4) will encourage justifications that will more
likely take the form of explaining why the absence of Security
Council authorization is not indicative of an absence of community
will, for example. If a state or group of states contemplates
intervention because of an arbitrary veto in the Council based on the
economic interests of a permanent member, and the General
Assembly overwhelmingly supports the unauthorized intervention,
then the impact on the Charter's use of force regime and sovereign
equality principle is distinct from that in a situation in which a state
undertakes an unauthorized intervention without bringing the matter
before the Council and against the wishes of the majority of the
member states of the United Nations. In that case, no matter how dire
the suffering in the target state, the unauthorized intervention signals
the resurgence of power politics as the basis for force and the
breakdown of a system in which sovereign states are equally bound
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by the law and in which force is concentrated in the hands of the
international community rather than entrusted to individual states.
This type of world order is necessarily incompatible with the
operation of international law.
Second, changing decision making and assessment to include
these concerns may put to rest the characterization of unauthorized
intervention as raising a conflict between what is law and what is
right. Greater acknowledgment of the merits of the prohibition
against the use of force-of its foundation not simply as a rule of
order or a rule to protect the state, but rather as a mechanism to limit
the exercise of national power in the international systemt 99 -may
allow for a more nuanced assessment of what is at stake in the debate
over unauthorized intervention, replacing the accepted approach to
the question as law versus morality, or sovereignty versus human
rights. By changing these stakes, instead of addressing the question as
a choice between saving hundreds or thousands of lives through
military action and doing nothing, policy makers may be more willing
to consider actions other than military intervention, such as early
attempts at preventive diplomacy or non-military sanctions.
C.

Defending a Focus on the Systemic Factorsin Unauthorized
HumanitarianIntervention

Ultimately, the framework this Article proposes is a plea to
protect the relevance of international law in evaluations of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention. The validity of this plea is
based on an assumption that international law plays an important role
in the operation of international society-a role that unshared
standards of morality, legitimacy, or ethics cannot. This sub-Part
discusses those functions of international law.
International legal rules on the use of force may be accused of
failing to shape state behavior, and in some cases, those restraints
clearly have failed to prevent a state from acting in contravention of
the Charter.2" But international law still operates to change states'
decisions and behavior. An examination of use of force cases in which
the prohibition against the use of force did not prevent a state from
using force demonstrates the functions that international law plays
apart from compliance. In the case of Kosovo, for example, NATO
member states indeed chose to act without Security Council
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (describing the Kosovo and Liberia
cases, in which states breached Article 2(4)).
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intervention, but they framed their actions in the language of the law.
Justifying the bombing campaign, the U.S. Permanent Representative
told the Council that the "Charter does not sanction armed assaults
upon ethnic groups, or imply that the international community should
turn a blind eye to a growing humanitarian disaster."2 1 Opponents
also used the language of international law to frame their arguments.
Russia characterized the NATO intervention as an "[a]ttempt[] to
apply a different standard to international law and to disregard its
basic norms and principles .... ,2' The actions of India nearly thirty
years earlier also demonstrate the power of international law.
Although the mass flight of East Pakistanis to escape violence at the
hands of a repressive government provided a powerful political
justification for military intervention in East Pakistan, India chose
instead to frame its action as self-defense, knowing that its most
promising chance for tolerance was in the law.2 °3
International law not only establishes rules that states, as
members of an international society, seek to guide behavior, but it
also provides a common language in which states can deliberate
competing claims about their rights and interests.2° Justifications for
unauthorized humanitarian interventions are framed in terms of
human rights law or enforcement of U.N. action, while challenges to
such interventions take up the language of nonintervention and
Security Council authorization. States speak in the language of
international law because it is more determinate than morals or
ethics. Although recent debates over the use of force reveal the wide
room for variance in interpretations of international law, the rules
of the Charter and of customary international law supply at least a
common framework from which those interpretations will be
discussed and debated. Contested norms of morality or ethics, on the
other hand, fail to provide states with a common framework for
debate. 2° Further, when states structure their arguments in the
201. Security Council 3989th Meeting, supra note 62, at 5.
202. Security Council 3988th Meeting, supra note 36, at 3.
203. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION 76 (2003)
(describing the Indian characterization of intervention); MURPHY, supra note 35, at 99
(same).
204. See FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE
CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 35, 181 (1991).

205. For a range of views published in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion, see
Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553-642 (2003).
206. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 182-84 (2006).
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language of international law, they affirm their belief that state
interests must be characterized by reference to the common
framework.2 °7 The same is true of the decision of states to use
international institutions as the forum for justification; the decision to
debate and defend state actions within the United Nations reflects an
intention to justify state behavior from within the structures created
by international law.
The impact of this process is not limited to transforming the
justificatory language for interventions; instead, it transforms the
justifications themselves. Instead of relying on "brute power" to
justify actions, "[e]ven the great powers seek approval from their
peers and domestic publics,"2 8 whether the aim in seeking approval is
to preserve their reputations of good standing in the international
sphere, to secure the cooperation of other governments in order to
pursue the particular matter at hand, or to garner public support.2 9
This process of seeking approval takes place as a social act of
interaction and discussion among states and other actors. If the
targets of the justifications change the terms of the discourse, states
attempting to justify their actions will be forced to consider their
actions in a new light. Accordingly, if states-as well as other
participants in the international system-reframe the debate over
humanitarian intervention by making inquiries into the extent to
which a use of force may subvert the power-restraining structures of
the international system, as I propose, then intervening states will in
turn be forced to look to those same values in determining whether
they will be able to justify their actions to the community. In this
sense, international law does more than merely impact a state's
choice of the words it uses to justify its interests; international law
also shapes those interests. Focusing on sovereign equality and the
community control of force would serve not only to illuminate
whether a proposed intervention does damage to the ability of the
international system to restrain a state's exercise of power, but also to
change the terms of the debate from questions of legitimacy, morality,
207. See COPLIN, supra note 174, at 193.
208. Wheeler, supra note 132, at 32; see OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59

(offprint from the Collected Courses 1985) (1982) ("True, in some cases [governments]
depend on power to be persuasive. But even in these cases, governments ...generally
base their legal case on grounds that are logically independent of their own interests and
wishes." (emphasis omitted)).
209. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 38

(1990); Oscar Schachter, Self-Defence and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J.INT'L L. 259, 264
(1989).
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or what is right to questions about the operation of the international
system and the extent to which the circumstances underlying a state's
interest in using unauthorized force is rooted in the failure of the
international system to operate as intended by the law.
CONCLUSION

This Article has aimed to challenge the predominant accounts of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention and offer an alternative
framework that considers the crucial, and neglected, systemic aspects
of the question. Discussions of unauthorized humanitarian
intervention often assume that existing international law fails to
accomplish the goals of the international community. This reaction,
however, mistakes the existence of competing normative claims for an
absence of a framework altogether. The problem is not that existing
international law fails to serve the goals of the community; it is that
there are several goals to fulfill. Although the idea of criminal law
defenses appears to be an intuitively attractive "way out" of the
problem of competing normative goals, upon deeper inspection it is
clear that the criminal law approach ignores one side of the normative
framework-the need for the international system to restrain the
exercise of power by states-rather than finding a way to reconcile it
with the need to protect human rights.
This problem is not limited to the context of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention. Both in anticipation of the 2003 invasion
of Iraq by the United States and in the post-mortem, commentators
pronounced the war illegal but legitimate, 210 again raising concerns
both about the difficulties of using criminal law concepts to
characterize interstate relations and about the considerations that are
guiding determinations of the legitimacy of an unlawful use of force.
This Article has attempted not only to demonstrate the immediate
importance of considering the principles of sovereign equality and
community control of force in the Charter, but also to explain how
focus on those considerations can consolidate the function of
international law, rather than amorphous standards of morality or
ethics, as the primary locus for debate on unauthorized humanitarian
intervention. This lesson is one that should also guide discussions of
preemptive or preventive self-defense, perhaps the next frontier in
which international law faces great risk of marginalization.
210. See, e.g., RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE, AND SECURITY 223
n.3 (2006) (describing characterizations of the invasion); Slaughter, supra note 5
(proposing that bypassing the United Nations could be" 'illegal but legitimate' ").
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